Arms transfers to Venezuela: a comparative and critical analysis of the acquisition process (1980-1996) by Segovia, Reinaldo
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1999-03
Arms transfers to Venezuela: a comparative and
critical analysis of the acquisition process (1980-1996)
Segovia, Reinaldo











ARMS TRANSFERS TO VENEZUELA: A COMPARATIVE









Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching
existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this
burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services,
Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management
and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
March 1999
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE : Arms Transfers to Venezuela: A Comparative and Critical Analysis










9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Certain aspects of the Venezuelan acquisition process for arms from 1980-1996 may have contributed to bribery and
corruption, thus making both Congress and the Venezuelan populace highly skeptical of requests for weapon acquisitions. This
thesis, a comparative and critical analysis, examines the Venezuelan acquisition process from 1980 to 1996, using the highly
structured U.S. acquisition model as a benchmark for comparison. The analysis traces the complex acquisition process in both
countries from the initial requests for materiel until the acquisition is made and the product is employed. This thesis further
describes the Venezuelan and the U.S. processes by using four frameworks: institutional, regulatory, organizational and the
process itself. This description also entails economic, social, and political factors that influence the procurement process. Many
differences in the processes, such as the country's resources and the size of its Armed Forces, are described. Other important
differences are the facts that, unlike the U.S. Congress, the Venezuelan Congress has a limited role in the procurement process,
and unlike the U.S., the Venezuelan President exerts supreme control, including economic control, over the Armed Forces. The
thesis proposes that Venezuela would benefit by adopting the practices of the U.S.
14. SUBJECT TERMS




















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
11
Dudley knoy
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimuAi'^L POSTnoAry..^^
ARMS TRANSFERS TO VENEZUELA: A COMPARATIVE AND CRITCAL
ANALYSIS OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS (1980-1996)
Reinaldo A. Segovia
Commander, Venezuelan Navy
B.S., Venezuelan Naval Academy, 1982
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of







Certain aspects of the Venezuelan acquisition process for arms from 1980-1996
may have contributed to bribery and corruption, thus making both Congress and the
Venezuelan populace highly skeptical of requests for weapon acquisitions.
This thesis, a comparative and critical analysis, examines the Venezuelan
acquisition process from 1980 to 1996, using the highly structured U.S. acquisition model
as a benchmark for comparison. The analysis traces the complex acquisition process in
both countries from the initial request for materiel until the acquisition is made and the
product is employed. This thesis further describes the Venezuelan and the U.S. processes
by using four frameworks: institutional, regulatory, organizational and the process itself.
This description also entails economic, social, and political factors that influence the
procurement process.
Many differences in the processes, such as the country's resources and the size of
its Armed Forces, are described. Other important differences are the facts that, unlike the
U.S. Congress, the Venezuelan Congress has a limited role in the procurement process,
and unlike the U.S., the Venezuelan President exerts supreme control, including
economic control, over the Armed Forces. The thesis proposes that Venezuela would
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A. THE NEED FOR ARMS AND FACTORS AFFECTING IT
Like many countries around the world, Venezuela must approach questions of
security and defense by considering its geography, its natural resources, and its regional
political interests. Since 1958, when democracy was definitely established in Venezuela,
two major considerations have delineated Venezuela's security policy more than others.
These are the nation's status as a major oil producer and member of the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and its role as a regional power within the
Caribbean Basin. 1 The country's defense posture, internal disposition of forces, its
relations with neighboring states, and its arms transfer are due, in large part, to these two
considerations. 2 With the development of Venezuela as a major oil producer and with
world-wide favorable prices, the National Armed Forces of Venezuela (Fuerzas Armadas
Nacionales, FAN) became one of the best equipped military forces in Latin America by
the 1970s and early 1980s. This also was due to Venezuela's shared interest with the U.S.
to counter Cuba's military strength and influences in the Caribbean Basin.
In 1977, the U.S. imposed an arms-transfer moratorium on the Latin American
nations [Ref.l], which instituted a "presumption of denial" of requests for attack jets and
other high technology items. Despite this restriction, Venezuela received twenty-four F-
16 fighters in 1983. In spite of some concern expressed by other regional powers, such as
Colombia, the Reagan administration pushed for this sale on the grounds that Venezuela
needed advanced aircraft to help protect the Caribbean sea-lanes, to secure its oil
resources against a possible external attack, and to secure the approaches to the Panama
Canal. In addition, the Reagan administration believed those allies, such as Venezuela,
should be encouraged to share strategic responsibilities with the U.S. and to complement
its military forces.
1 The Caribbean Basin is a broad geopolitical region encompassing all nations and dependencies in or
bordering the Caribbean Sea. This area includes all Caribbean Islands, northern South America, Central
America, Mexico, and the United States.
2 In this thesis, we define arm transfer as imports "only" of military equipment, usually referred to as
"conventional" including weapons of war, parts, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities
designed for military use. (The U.S. Arms Control, and Disarmament Agency uses both imports and
exports for defining arms transfer).
The neighboring Colombia's concern for Venezuela having such military strength
still exists in 1999. This concern is primarily due to the disparities between Venezuela
and Colombia fixing their boundaries. The most visible irritant in this relationship is the
boundary demarcation of the Venezuelan gulf, a conflict that stretches back to colonial
times. This conflict reached its peak on August 9, 1987, when the Colombian warship
"ARC CALDAS" (Exocet equipped corvette) entered Venezuelan waters in a clear
violation of sovereignty. Venezuela avoided direct confrontation with its neighbor and
the problem was solved diplomatically. In addition to this, Venezuela has suffered from
Colombia's guerillas attacks in Venezuelan border areas since the late 1980s. Also,
Colombian drug traffic has become another menace and reason for the Venezuelan
Government to equip the Armed Forces.
With the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union disappearing as the prime
arms provider to Cuba, the U.S. has been reconsidering the Venezuelan role in the
Caribbean. The U.S. focus on combating the drug problem has been a primary concern
for transferring arms not only to Venezuela but to Colombia as well. Because of this and
other factors, the U.S. decided on August 1, 1997, to end the 20-year moratorium on the
sale of advanced weaponry to Latin American countries.
Venezuela has historically depended on external sources for its arms
requirements. Therefore, about six to eight percent of its annual defense expenditures are
used in foreign currency for defense procurement. These defense procurements are
influenced by internal conflicts, external threats, such as the 1987 Colombian crisis, or by
economic prosperity. These influences were confirmed by Gertrude Heare in her 1971
study, and in 1973 by P. Schmitter [Ref.2: p. 117-118] who showed that such factors
affected military expenditures in Latin America. In Venezuela, determining a particular
trend in military expenditures has been difficult. However, these factors earlier
mentioned have a strong influence in Venezuela's defense expenditures.
Since Venezuela's years of economic boom ended, the Venezuelan Armed
Forces have been constrained from acquiring new weapon systems. In addition to the
economic crisis, the military equipment acquired in the "good times" is aging. Thus, the
Armed Forces must modernize and maintain this equipment in order to accomplish their
tasks and missions. The Venezuelan Government has been achieving most of this
modernization by way of public debt. Since 1984, when the Venezuelan economic crisis
started, the Venezuelan Armed Forces have been receiving additional credits for weapon
acquisitions with funds raised from government bonds and other public debt.
Although Latin America has the lowest percentage of weapon acquisition
expenditures compared to its gross national product, with an average of two percent for
the region[Ref 3], countries like Venezuela continue purchasing weapons in order to
maintain an equilibrium in the region, and to combat the new guerilla and narcotraffic
threats.
Venezuela defense expenditures have been decreasing since 1980 because of the
declining oil prices worldwide. While the Venezuelan defense expenditures have been
increasing as a result of currency depreciation, the expenditures in U.S. constant dollars
have been declining. This coincides with the Schmitter and Heare studies made in the
1970s [Ref.2: p. 1 17-1 18]. In the following graph, the Venezuelan defense expenditures
are shown in both local currency (Bolivares, Bs) and U.S. constant dollars. The increases
and decreases during those years coincide with those factors considered by Schmitter and
Heare affecting defense expenditures and mentioned on page two of this chapter:




Venezuela Defense Expenditures from Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, 1998
In view of this economic turmoil in Venezuela and due to the cuts in government
spending, the Venezuelan Armed Forces have been forced to maximize the value of each
expenditure to accomplish the mission established by the constitution and other laws. In
addition, because of these budget reductions, Congress has imposed more restrictions on
acquiring weapon systems through debt, because it believes that the Armed Forces should
be financed by funds other than debt. In that sense, many legislators advocate creating a
special financial law to fund the Armed Forces. These members of Congress also believe
that they must revise the structure and size of the Armed Forces and adjust its mission to
meet the new strategic requirements of the country [Ref.4].
Venezuela depends heavily on foreign industrialized countries for arms transfers.
Since 1977 when the U.S. banned the sale of weapon systems to Latin America,
Venezuela, as did many other countries, went to other international markets to purchase
weapon systems. Due to surprising increases in revenue, and to the Colombian crisis in
the Venezuelan gulf, Venezuela accelerated the process for acquiring new weapon
systems from European and Asian countries. In addition, Venezuela recently contracted
the modernization and maintenance of these systems. These processes carried incredible
contracting problems. For example, in 1985, the Venezuelan Government contracted the
company, Yulecris International, and the U.S. Company A.V. Technology to build 300
Dragon Vehicles. On May 5, 1997, a legal study was introduced to Congress reflecting a
possible overprice in the contract. Another example was the 1988 contract for
modernizing Venezuelan Navy patrol boats by the Italian company, Oto Melara. In that
case, Oto Melara did not finish the job and payments were illegally made, defrauding
Venezuela of about 9.5 million dollars. A last example of these deficiencies was the
contract for modernizing 81 Army AMX-30 tanks by the Venezuelan-Italian Van Dam
company on August 7, 1988. In this case, the contracting company received payment for
more than 70 percent of the contract price without delivering any operational tanks.
It was during these and other acquisition processes that many cases of bribery
and corruption were exposed, and even today, many of these cases are still in courts of
law. These cases were ignited, primarily, by some European countries such as France and
Germany where bribery was granted by these governments as a tax reduction for defense
contractors [Ref.5]. For these reasons, as well as the decreasing purchasing power of the
Venezuelan government, the Congress started a campaign against weapon acquisitions,
and started to scrutinize the acquisition processes carefully.
This situation created a lack of confidence in the Armed Force's acquisition
process and a loss of credibility by the Venezuelan citizens in their Armed Forces.
Despite these facts, neither Congress nor the Armed Forces made serious analysis of the
bribery and corruption problems that the Armed Forces were facing.
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS AND METHODOLOGY
Little research has been carried out to verify whether the acquisition process for
the arms transfer to Venezuela between 1980 and 1996 was an important factor in
permitting bribery and corruption, making both Congress and the Venezuelan populace
highly skeptical of the Armed Forces' request for weapon acquisitions. This thesis is a
comparative analysis of the Venezuelan acquisition process over a period of sixteen
years, using the U.S. acquisition process as a model. This thesis also presents the
Venezuelan acquisition process and determines to what extent it can be improved
—
reducing bribery, corruption, and streamlining the process—by applying the U.S.
acquisition model as a benchmark for comparative analysis. The analysis will be made
by considering the defense acquisition process as a complex procedure for translating
mission needs into a stable, affordable, and well managed acquisition program. A
description of the Venezuela and the U.S. process is developed which includes the most
relevant factors influencing the different stages of this process. The four main
frameworks considered in this analysis are
D the institutional framework, where the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
branch are examined
D the regulatory framework where constitution, laws, and other regulations
controlling and affecting the process are taken into account
the organizational framework, where all offices intervening into the process
are described
D the procurement process framework, where the different steps, activities, and
decisions are described
The methodology for this research was based on the inductive method,3 which
helps us answer our primary question: To what extent can Venezuela's Armed Forces
acquisition process be improved—reducing bribery and corruption and streamlining the
process—by applying the U.S. acquisition model as a benchmark for comparative
analysis?
The descriptions and ideas in this thesis have resulted mainly from researching
relevant literature. The literature studied included: the constitutions of both countries,
laws, regulations, presidential orders and other government documents concerning the
acquisition process; congressional reports, studies and books on acquisition processes,
and to the maximum extent, use of the Internet as a reliable source of information.
3 The inductive method is the process by which a theory is generated. In this method if the researcher does
not have an answer to a question, he starts a fact-finding process to obtain an answer and to generate a
theory. (Buckleys and Chiang, Research Methodology and Business Decisions, National Association of
Accountants, 1976. P. 21)
For this research, the comparative analysis method was used. This method was
based on a 1973 study by Neil Smelser regarding methodology in comparative analysis
[Ref.6: p 45-52]. With Smelser' s study as my primary reference, my thesis analyzes the
similarities and differences of the acquisition processes in the U.S. and in Venezuela.
C. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Being a highly complex procedure, the acquisition process involves many
definitions and since so many offices and different defense organizations of both
countries are involved, many abbreviations are used. In order to avoid confusing the
reader, the definitions and abbreviations are explained in the text and in footnotes
whenever necessary.
In order to develop a basic understanding of the acquisition process, I considered
the definition of a Defense Acquisition System given by the Defense Systems
Management College in its guidebook Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management
[Ref.7: PI]:
The defense acquisition system is a single uniform system whereby all
equipment, facilities, and services are planned, developed, acquired,
maintained, and disposed of by the Department of Defense (DOD). The
system includes policies and practices that govern acquisition, identifying
and prioritizing resource requirements, directing and controlling the
process, and contracting and reporting to Congress.
Although this definition is based on a U.S. defense management agency, I
considered it applicable to both countries since the overall process—to obtain goods and
services for the Armed Forces—is the same in both the U.S. and in Venezuela.
The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), designed to provide uniform
regulations among all executive agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, use
the term "acquisition" in place of "procurement," the latter term being synonymous with
"contracting," as a subset of acquisition functions. In this thesis both terms,
"procurement" and "acquisition," are synonyms.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS
Any comparisons between the processes and procedures used by two different
countries are difficult to make. Many variables influencing the procedures are unique to
a particular country or organization. For this reason, the acquisition processes for both
countries are described in Chapter II and HI. The four frameworks already mentioned
(institutional, regulatory, organizational, and procurement process frameworks) are used
to describe all the factors affecting the acquisition process in both countries.
Chapter IV establishes a comparative analysis of both the Venezuelan and U.S.
acquisition processes based on the four frameworks previously described. There, the
differences and similarities in both processes are emphasized using the frameworks
considered for this analysis. Additionally, in this chapter some factors which are causing
bribery and corruption and which are also reducing efficiency in Venezuela's process are
analyzed.
Finally, Chapter V develops conclusions and findings based on the descriptions
and comparisons made in the precedent chapters. In addition, this chapter answers the
question: To what extent can the Venezuelan acquisition process be improved by
applying the U.S. acquisition model as a standard for comparative analysis?
Furthermore, several recommendations are made in order to evaluate the feasibility of
improving the Venezuelan acquisition process, reducing bribery and corruption and
streamlining the process, based on the results presented in this research.

II. THE VENEZUELAN ARMED FORCES ACQUISITION PROCESS
As a sovereign nation, Venezuela sustains its national security and protects its
borders with the Armed Forces. In order to accomplish this important and fundamental
mission, the armed Forces must train personnel, and acquire weapon systems and a
diversity of materiel. In this chapter the procurement process of the Venezuelan Armed
Forces will be described as well as the organizations, regulations and other factors
affecting this process.
A. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Venezuela is constitutionally a Republic. In addition, the Republic is also
considered a federal state (Constitution Art. 2). Because of the transformation of the
country, divided in autonomous regions along the lines of the federation established in
1811 and consolidated in 1864, this federation functioned politically until the beginning
of this century and then became unified over the last 90 years. Venezuela began to be
decentralized with the enactment of the Organic Law4 for Decentralization and Transfer
of Powers in 1989 [Ref.8:]. In accordance with the federal system, the Venezuelan
Constitution makes a distinction between departments proper to national, state, or local
power. On a national level (national government), public functions are distributed among
the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches. Since the government is responsible
for the national security, and since the existence of the Armed Forces depends on the
government, a discussion of these three branches, and their roles in the procurement
process is necessary.
1. Congress
The Congress of the Republic of Venezuela is the caucus by which the
representatives of the Venezuelan people exercise legislative power. Two chambers
constitute the Congress: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (Cons. Art. 138).
Universal, secret, and direct voting elect the members of the two chambers every five
years at the same time as the President. Congress is empowered to legislate on matters of
national competence and to regulate the operation of the different branches of the
national government as well as to exercise control over the public administration (Cons.
4 Organic laws are statutes enacted by the Venezuelan Congress and further signed by the President.
Art. 139 and 160). Each one of the legislative chambers also has exclusive functions.
For example, the Senate is entitled to authorize the executive power to carry out different
administrative acts including defense procurement, and the Chamber of Deputies is
empowered to open the discussion of the annual budget law.
Both chambers in Congress have a permanent Defense Commission with seven
members each. One of the members, normally from a majority party, exerts the
presidency of the commission. These commissions are responsible for overall functions
assigned constitutionally, such as studying different law projects, agreements,
resolutions, demands in specific defense affairs, and investigations. In addition, the
Defense Commissions in both chambers can name subcommissions that will oversee
studies and considerations on specific affairs, which are assigned to them. Once the study
is completed, the subcommissions prepare a report, which is discussed when the
Commissions are in full session. In addition, these Defense Commissions are in charge
of initiating studies in order to accomplish specific functions clearly stated in the
Constitution. For example, the Senate Defense Commission is responsible for studying
and submitting authorization of Venezuelan military missions abroad, to authorize
foreign military missions within the country (Article 150, Numeral 4), and to authorize
the promotion of officers of the Armed Forces from Colonel or Captain and upper ranks
(Article 150, Numeral 5). In the case of the Chamber of Deputies, the Defense
Commission can initiate studies concerning the budget of the Armed Forces or other
similar affairs. This commission also has the authority to conduct hearings in defense
affairs and to censure the Defense Minister when necessary.
Legislative Oversight
The Venezuelan Congress has the General Comptroller of the Republic
Office as an auxiliary organ to control the public administration. According to the
Constitution, the Comptroller General of the Republic Office has the responsibility to
control and oversee income, spending, and goods of the nation as well as the operations
related to them. (Article 234). On December 13, 1995 a new Organic Law of the
Comptroller General of the Republic was enacted and published in the Official Gazette of
Venezuela5 [Ref.9:]. This organic law states in its Article 5 that all the departments of the
government that integrate the public administration are subject to the vigilance, oversight
* The Official Gazette of Venezuela (Gaceta Oficial [GO]) publishes all the national laws, regulations, and
decrees previously approved by the respective power. In Venezuela all the statutes, regulations, decrees,
and other official directives must be published in the official gazette to be officially valid. This is in
accordance with the Law on Official Publications of 1941. (G.O. N° 20546 of July 22, 1941)
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and control of the Comptroller General of the Republic Office. However, the same law
establishes in its Article 36 that the expenditures for security and defense of the State are
exempt from the control of the Comptroller General of the Republic Office. According
to this law, only the orders of payment for these expenditures require verification by the
Comptroller General of the Republic. The directive that regulates the Organic Law of the
Comptroller General of the Republic Office defines in Article 8 the following as
expenditures for security and defense:
in the Ministry of Defense the payments to military personnel and
expenditures in commission services, funds for the acquisition, operation,
maintenance and repairs of weapon systems, public security equipment, and
telecommunications
funds assigned for operation of intelligence organizations, military liaisons in
foreign countries, and military operations involving the security and defense
of the nation
These expenditures are classified by law as "secrets" and consequently are
exempt from the regulatory control of the Comptroller General of the Republic. This
comptroller function is delegated to the Comptroller General of the Armed Forces, and
consequently Congress loses its oversight power over such expenditures. Other
expenditures, not mentioned above, are considered by law as "ordinaries," which means
that they are discretionary and subject to oversight by the Comptroller General of the
Republic.
In addition to the above, politicians with little knowledge about defense
affairs have integrated the Venezuelan Congress, and specifically the Defense
Commissions, through the years. Consequently, due to this lack of knowledge, the
participation of these commissions in making decisions and accomplishing their
regulatory functions in security and defense has been limited. Therefore, many defense
budget requests, investigations, and procurements of weapon systems passed through
these commissions without much scrutiny. Although the 1961 Constitution mandates
oversight of the public administration to Congress, it was not until recently, when many
scandals appeared in defense procurements, that Congress started looking closely at these
processes. On February 14, 1998, Deputy Bernard Alvarez, a member of the Defense
Commission, stated that the participation of Congress in the Defense Affairs has been
limited to the role of merely authorizing defense spending. As a result, Congress has a
marginal participation in generating defense policies and immense limitations on
controlling the Armed Forces. This situation, said the deputy, "generates a model that
imposes constraints in democratic control" [Ref.10]. Also since the Venezuelan
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President has the authority to organize and to administer the Armed Forces, Congress
exerts a minor influence in such matters
2. Executive
The 1961 Constitution continues a long tradition of a powerful president, who
serves as head of state and chief executive. As mentioned, the Venezuelan President
exerts constitutionally the supreme authority over the Armed Forces. Consequently, he
has the power to administer and deploy the Armed Forces and has the final decision to
approve the defense procurement request presented by the Defense Minister who is
responsible for the overall process. The President also exercises sole control of foreign
policy. He can authorize expenditures outside the budget and can negotiate loans in the
name of the Republic. In addition, the President has the constitutional power to appoint
and to remove the Defense Minister without congressional consent. Moreover, the
President has the power to dictate the directives that regulate the implementation of the
organic laws enacted by Congress. These regulations are not subject to the approval of
Congress, and the courts are not empowered to review them. Thus, the President has a
strong influence in the defense procurement process since he is constitutionally
empowered to intervene, not only to develop directives regulating the processes but even
to appoint the authority responsible for the process. Moreover the President can declare
national emergencies and consequently can obtain supplies from the industrial base and
can even temporarily restrict or suspend constitutional guarantees. Finally, the President
can—as stated in the Organic Law of the Armed Forces—appoint the Comptroller
General of the Armed Forces.
Executive departments and agencies
Following a long military tradition in Latin America, the Minister of
Defense of Venezuela is an active duty Major General or Vice-Admiral. He is appointed
by the President and normally remains in charge of the Ministry no longer than two years.
The Minister of Defense is responsible for the overall procurement process according to
the Organic Law of the Armed Forces. Also, according to the same law, the president
appoints the Comptroller General of the Armed Forces who is also a general officer on
active duty. Both the Minister of Defense and the Comptroller General of the Armed
Forces are the main agents in the defense procurement process, so most of the
procurement decision making, control, and oversight functions are executed by the
military. This is confirmed by Richard Downes, a military analyst from Miami
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University, who states that " In Latin America there is little effective civilian control of
the military," and added, "the key decisions are made by the military...." [Ref. 1 1]
According to the Organic Law of Central Administration6 the Minister of
Defense has the following procurement responsibilities:
to serve as direct agent of the president in administering the Armed Forces
D to organize, set doctrine, oversee, and to deploy the Armed Forces
D to fabricate or procure all materials needed by the military. This includes
importing, exporting, storing, transporting, registering and trading war
materiels and weapon systems
D to elaborate programs, projects and to supervise all construction of military
installations, buildings and other constructions related to the national defense
In addition, the Minister of Defense has the authority to delegate the
procurement of certain goods and services for the Armed Forces to each Chief of Service,
yet the Minister maintains the responsibility for the procurement. This situation applies
only when the funds to be expended are from the budget law and not from additional or
extra-budget funds. In the latter, only the Minister is responsible for the process and does
not have the authority for delegation, as we will see in the description of the procurement
process.
The Comptroller General of the Armed Forces Office is, according to the
Organic Law of the Armed Forces, the highest organ to exert internal control of the
administration of the Armed Forces, including defense procurement. Among the
responsibilities assigned to the Comptroller General of the Armed Forces the following
concern defense procurement:
D to dictate policies and instructions, as well as to practice continuous
evaluations of the internal control system of the Ministry of Defense
D to open administrative investigations against public officials within the
Defense Sector when the public patrimony is endangered
to verify the execution of the budget law according to the needs of the
different services
to review the state of the materiel used for security and defense
6 The Organic Law of Central Administration (G.O. N° 5025 , Dec. 20, 1995) establishes the guidelines to
organize and administer the ministries and establishes the primarily responsibilities for each one of the
Ministers of the executive cabinet.
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D to exert control before receiving weapon systems and others materials that are
a result of procurement processes
In addition to the above, the Comptroller General of the Armed Forces
acts as a liaison between the Ministry of Defense and the Comptroller General of the
Republic Office. Furthermore, the Comptroller General of the Armed Forces has the
responsibility to supply all the necessary documents requested by the auxiliary office of
the Congress as stated by law.
3. Judicial
The administration of justice in Venezuela is a duty of the Government and it is
exercised through the courts of the Republic. The law on the Judiciary of 1987 regulates
the courts [Ref.12]. The Council of the Judicature, an autonomous constitutional organ
regulated by its organic law, governs the courts. Within the defense procurement process,
there are three levels involved: commercial courts, military courts, and administrative
courts.
The courts involved in defense procurement are placed in hierarchical order and
have jurisdiction according to the amount of money involved in the process or the
importance of the case. In general, court decisions can be appealed to a higher court, but
a case cannot be heard in more than two instances. Only decisions handed down in the
second instance can be appealed before the Supreme Court of the Republic.
The Supreme Court of Justice is constitutionally the highest tribunal of the
Republic and therefore the last resource for appellation. The Supreme Court presided
over by fifteen justices who are appointed by Congress, applies the principle of
subjecting the state to the rule of law. This rule of law is guaranteed by the existence of
judicial review of administrative action courts, which are integrated in the judiciary. The
Political Administrative Division of the Supreme Court of Justice exercises this special
jurisdiction together with the First Court on Judicial Review of Administrative Action
and fifteen superior courts. All these courts are competent to annul general or individual
administrative acts contrary to law, including abuse of power. In addition, they make
judgments for monetary payments, the reparation of damages for which the
administration is responsible, and they are responsible for taking the necessary steps to
reestablish law and order when illegal administrative activities occur. These courts were
also, until recently, the judiciary resource for claims by defense contractors.
The Venezuelan Congress enacted on March 25, 1998, the Arbitration
Commercial Law, which filled a legal void that existed in the legislation. The Arbitration
Law also established the norms and procedures for the arbitration process (Chapter TV,
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Arbitration Law), and allows parties to solve disputes or claims before going to court.
Consequently, this new law permits both the contractor and the government to avoid
spending funds in costly court cases.
This law describes two types of arbitration: institutional and independent. Any
commercial association or international association related to the national economy can
act as arbiter in an institutional arbitration. Three arbiters selected by the parties
(contractor and Government) in dispute exercise the independent arbitration.
Furthermore, Congress enacted in 1982 the Organic Law of Safeguard and Public
Patrimony (Ley Organica del Patrimonio Publico). This law put in place the Courts of
Safeguard and Public Patrimony in order to prevent corruption and to pursue and sanction
public servants and contractors involved in corruption cases.
Finally, the Comptroller General of the Republic has the authority to act in
bidding processes canceling the award and annulling these when necessary and applying
sanctions if required.
B. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
In Venezuela, the principle of written law prevails. Therefore, precedent is
considered an auxiliary or subsidiary source of law. Court decisions are not sources of
law but the interpretation of them can be used as reference. When there is no written law,
the civil code considers analogy and the principles of law as formal sources of law. As a
result, since the regulation framework is the written law that affects defense procurement,
this regulation framework plays an important role in Venezuela's Armed Forces
procurement process.
1. Constitution
The Constitution of January 23, 1961, is the supreme source of law in Venezuela.
This Constitution is the twenty-fifth since the declaration of independence in 1811. From
it, the bases for the procurement process are established. The Venezuelan Constitution
designates the following authority to the government:
the organization and regimen of the Armed Forces
the approval of Congress to sign contracts of national interest
the inclusion of a clause in national interest contracts mandating that doubts
and controversies that can appear in public contracts must be solved by courts
of the Republic of Venezuela
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In addition, the constitution establishes the authority and responsibilities in the
legislative, executive, and judiciary branches of the Government affecting defense
procurement.
2. Statutes
On the national level, legislation is made up of organic and ordinary laws; the
former occupies an intermediate position between ordinary laws and the Constitution.
Congress enacts the organic laws in Venezuela under absolute majority of both chambers
(Constitution Art. 163). In addition, the constitution states that the laws that
systematically assemble the rules on a specific subject can be called codes. Only the
Commercial Code [Ref.13] affects defense procurement since it establishes the principles
to initiate commercial activities and their relationships with third parties only within
Venezuelan territory.
The organic laws are the most important affecting the defense procurements.
They specify the authority, responsibilities, and the main procedures for the procurement
process. The following are the organic laws influencing the procurement process:
D Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic
Organic Law of the Armed Forces
Organic Law of Central Administration
D Organic Law of Public Credit
Organic Law of Safeguard and Public Patrimony
Organic Law of National Public Treasury
D Organic Law of Budgetary Regimen
Organic Law of Administrative Procedures
Organic Law of Customs
All these laws contain regulations to be applied during the procurement process
and as such are considered mandatory.
3. Regulations
The Venezuelan constitution empowers the President to dictate the directives that
regulate the implementation of the organic laws. Consequently, the president signs the
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directives that regulate the organic laws affecting defense procurement. In addition, the
President exerts control over the procurement process by the way of decrees or
instructions. The following decrees and directives are fundamental in defense
procurement:
Norms for the Acquisition of War Material and Equipment for the Armed
Forces through Public Credit Operations. Presidential Decree N° 175 of June
27, 1984
D Norms for Orienting Demand of Building, Goods and Services from the
Public Sector to the National Production. Presidential decree N° 1 ,234 from
October 8, 1981
D Regulation about Public Bidding, Private Bidding and Direct Adjudication for
Contracting Construction and Acquiring Goods for the Public Administration.
Presidential Decree N° 534 from March 15, 1985
D General Conditions for Contracting Constructions. Presidential Decree N°
1,802 from January 20, 1983
Also, the Comptroller General of the Republic dictates regulations affecting
defense procurement. These regulations are published in form of "circulars" or by
resolutions of the Comptroller General of the Republic.
Finally, the Minister of Defense, the Comptroller General of the Armed Forces,
the commanders of each service and other heads of department, such as the Chief of the
Joint General Staff, can dictate regulations under their authority in the form of
"directives" or resolutions. The following represents the most important directives
affecting defense procurement:
D Norms for the Acquisition of Goods and Services to be Supplied to the
National Armed Forces. Directive of the Comptroller General of the Armed
Forces N° OAT-01-86 from June 13, 1986
D Regulation for the Acquisition of Goods and Services for the National Armed
Forces. Resolution of the Minister of Defense N° 7,587 from June 27, 1988
C. ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK
1. Ministry of Defense
Most of the offices involved in the acquisition process are concentrated in the
Ministry of Defense because the Minister of Defense has maximum responsibility for
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defense procurement. In the Ministry of Defense, the following organizations are
actively involved in the acquisition process: the General Administration Direction, the
General Direction of Planning and Budgeting, the Legal Consultant, and the Joint Chief
of Staff Office. The General Administration Director has the mission to coordinate, lead,
and supervise the financial and administrative activities of the Armed Forces through the
systems of budgeting, contracting, acquisitions, accounting, and payment. This director
works closely with the General Direction of Planning and Budgeting on implementing the
acquisition and supply systems, contracting, accounting and budgeting systems. In
addition, the General Director of Administration coordinates with the Comptroller
General of the Armed Forces the controls of the Administration of the financial resources
as well as the register of all transactions and accounting systems.
The General Direction of Planning and Budgeting primarily coordinates the
planning and budgeting of the Armed Forces as well as the allocation of the financial
resources assigned to the defense sector. The Direction of Planning and Budgeting
coordinates with the General Direction of Administration the economic studies required
in order to maximize the use of the financial resources assigned to the defense sector. In
addition, this office analyzes the Armed Forces' needs for extra-budget requirements for
acquiring weapon systems, equipment, and other war materiel.
The Legal Consultant has the responsibility to review the contract projects and to
provide a legal opinion during the procurement process. Furthermore, he can put in
writing the contracts when the minister requires it.
Finally, the Joint Chief of Staff Office is responsible for determining the strategic
and logistical justification of the weapon system or materiel to be procured. This last case
occurs only when the expenditures are classified as security and defense (secret funds),
and the financial resources are from public credit and additional to the current budget.
2. The Comptroller General of the Republic Office
The Comptroller General of the Republic Office is the auxiliary organization of
the Venezuelan Congress with the constitutional function to oversee the public
administration. Therefore, this office oversees the procurement process of the Ministry of
Defense under the conditions stated earlier in this chapter.
3. The Comptroller General of the Armed Forces Office
The Comptroller General of the Armed Forces Office is the other organization
actively involved in the Venezuelan Procurement process. Within the organization of the
comptroller office, the following offices participate in defense procurement:
D Direction of Control for Secret Expenditures
D Direction of Control for Ordinary Expenditures
D Direction of Investigation
Direction of Auditing
These directions accomplish the functions, which were stated on page fourteen of
this chapter, mandated by law for the Comptroller General of the Armed Forces.






















Figure 2. Comptroller General of the Armed Forces of Venezuela Organization Chart
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4. Head of Services
Each commander of service has a Logistic Command with a Direction of
Acquisition. These directions have subordinate departments such as Contract and
Bidding, Planning, Public Credit, Verification and Control, and Reception. These
directions are also responsible for preparing all documents during the procurement
process once a need is determined and a purchase is required. In addition, each service
has a planning and budgeting office with the responsibility to plan the required financial
resources and to produce the annual budget.
D. PROCUREMENT PROCESS
1. Focus
The Venezuelan Military portion of the overall Government budget rarely exceeds
10 percent. From 1950 until 1986, Venezuela military expending as a percentage of the
gross domestic product was between 1.5 and 2 percent. [Ref.14: p. 196]. Inasmuch
through the years, the Armed Forces have been constrained from making defense
procurements from the current budget. In addition, the lack of a significant domestic
arms industry and the consequent importing of almost all of its weaponry represented
another constraint in defense procurement. In 1975, the Armed Forces attempted to
address this deficiency by establishing the Venezuelan Military Industries Company
(Compania Anonima de Industrias Nacionales [CAVIN]). However, by the 1990s,
CAVIN had made little progress. Domestic arms production consists of ammunition,
small arms, explosives, some spare parts, and coastal patrol boats for the Navy and the
National Guard. As a result, the Venezuelan procurement process has focused primary
on acquiring imported weapon systems. These acquisitions are characterized by obtaining
mature systems from industrialized allies in the global market.
2. Acquisition Phases
The Presidential Decree N° 175 (Norms for the Acquisition of War Materiel
through Credit Public Operations), mentioned in section B of this chapter (Regulation
Framework), establishes the acquisition phases for the procurement of weapon systems.
Even though this decree covers only the procurement process for weapon systems
acquired by public credit, we consider this decree as the foundation for determining the
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acquisition phases. This is due to the reason previously explained that the Venezuelan
Armed Forces have been constrained from making weapon acquisitions from the current
budget. Therefore, the only source of funds for procurement and maintenance of weapon
systems is public credit or debt.
The Decree N° 175 describes the steps for the acquisition process. Since the
Venezuelan Defense Organization does not have any documents defining the acquisition
phases, we use this presidential decree in order to develop the acquisition phases and
milestones during the procurement process. The decree N° 175 initiates the description
of the process by ordering each service and the head of each department to solicit
permission from the Minister of Defense to initiate acquisition projects not covered by
the current budget. Once the studies are finished, the heads of departments or Chiefs of
Service present the Minister with a project reflecting the employment, logistics, technical
capabilities, and financial requirements to explain the need and benefits of the
acquisition. Then the Minister of Defense sends the Joint Chief of Staff Office the
acquisition project for analysis. The Joint Chief of Staff Office then generates a strategic
and logistic study and issues an opinion about the project based on the General Plan for
Development of the Armed Forces. After that, the Minister of Defense presents the
project with the opinion of the Joint Chief of Staff Office to the Joint General Staff of the
Armed Forces. This consultative organization evaluates the project in function of
equilibrium of forces (internal and external) and according to the national situation. Once
the project is approved, the Minister of Defense sends it to the Comptroller General of the
Armed Forces. The Comptroller General of the Armed Forces then makes a price analysis
and formulates recommendations according to his function. After this evaluation, the
Minister of Defense sends the project to the Minister of Finance who determines the
financial aspects of the project based on the government fiscal income and debt. Finally,
the Minister of Defense presents the project to the President for approval.
Once the project reaches this point, the Direction of General Administration of the
Ministry of Defense revises the project and confirms with the Ministry of Finance that
funds are available for the project. Then the project is sent to the Ministry Council for
consideration (rarely are the projects rejected at this point). Once the Ministry Council
approves the project, the Legal Consultant of the Ministry of Defense revises the project
and the contract clauses and then submits these to the Minister who signs the contract.
Finally, the contract is sent to the Direction General of Administration Office which is
responsible for sending the contract to the service office or the head of department who is
responsible for its implementation and control.
Figure 3 below illustrates the acquisition process described above:
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Figure 3. Venezuelan Armed Forces Acquisition Phases
From this figure, we see that these milestones are the approval of the acquisition
project by an organization or consultative agency. The price analysis and revision by the
Comptroller General of the Armed Forces and the availability of funds by the Ministry of
Treasury are not really considered as milestones in the process. These last two
procedures together with the approval of the Ministers Council are considered
administrative and do not create real changes in the technical characteristics of the
weapon systems to be procured.
3. Funding
As stated before, the funds for procurement on defense have two sources. The
first is the annual budget, which follows a planning, programming and budgeting phase.
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The Organic Law of Budgetary Regimen and the Annual Budget Law regulate this
process for obtaining funds. 7 The second source of funds is government debt. The
Organic Law of Public Credit establishes the process to obtain funds by this means.
Additionally, every year Congress enacts a law that authorizes the executive to contract
and execute credit public operations during that fiscal year. This law defines the kind of
financial operations (treasury letters, treasury bonds and others type of government
financing) that the Government can use in that particular year in order to obtain the
approved funds. These operations are authorized following recommendations of the
Venezuelan Central Bank and approval of the finance commissions in Congress.
In the process to develop the annual current budget, the Venezuelan Armed
Forces develop the planning phase based on presidential policies and the Nation's
Defense Plan, which is written by the National Security and Defense Council. 8 After that,
the programming phase is developed by the Direction General of Programming and
Budgeting of the Ministry of Defense. This programming is based on directives given by
the Central Office of Budget (Oficina Central de Presupuesto [OCEPRE]), which is the
presidential agency with overall responsibility to formulate the national budget. Then,
the Direction General of Programming and Budgeting of the Ministry of Defense sends
the instructions for developing their respective budgets to each chief of service and head
of department. Finally, the Direction of Programming and Budgeting receives from
budgets the services and the heads of departments and consolidates the defense sector's
budget. This defense budget is presented to the OCEPRE for corrections and approval
and then with the national budget is sent to Congress for study. The Venezuelan Congress
through its finance commissions studies the budget, and makes the necessary
adjustments. Then Congress enacts the budget for that fiscal year, and it is sent to the
President who signs or vetoes that budget.
4. Procurement Methods and Source Selection
In 1990, the Venezuelan Congress enacted the Bidding Law. This was the first
written law where specific procurement methods are defined and the principles to apply
them are established. Although the Minister of Defense signs the contracts, the chief of
The annual budget law is similar to the U.S. annual appropriation and authorization bills, but are put
together in a single document.
8 The National Security and Defense Council is composed of the Minister of Defense, the Minister of
Interior, The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance and the permanent secretary of the
council who is an active duty general appointed by the President.
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services and heads of departments are responsible for the procurement method. In this
law three different procurement methods are established. The first is the General Bidding
method (full and open competition) where all the participant companies summit a bid in a
sealed envelope. In this case, the contractor is only required to be registered as a
government contractor in the Venezuelan Registry of Contractors. This registry, which
became electronically available on the Internet in 1997, is managed by a presidential
agency, the Central Office for Statistics and Information Systems, which is responsible
for maintaining all the information on government contractors.
The second procurement method is the Selective Bidding where the chief service
or head of department makes a pre-selection based on recommendations of the bidding
committee appointed for the process. The pre-selection of possible offerors is based on
the company's technical and financial capabilities to state clearly a determined
requirement in a pre-selection process. Once the companies are pre-selected, they can
offer their bids based on technical, operational and financial capabilities. These factors,
with price, are the main considerations in the source selection process.
Finally, the third and last procurement method is direct adjudication. In order to
accomplish procurement by this means, the defense agency must justify and document
the reason why a singular contractor is considered in the procurement.
All three methods use a bidding committee, which is responsible for the overall
bidding process and for making recommendations to the chief of service or head of the
agency who is responsible for granting the award.
After the approval of the award by any of three methods of procurement, the chief
of service informs the Minister of Defense of the award and makes the final adjustments
to the contract.
5. Contracts
As described in the acquisition phases in this chapter, the acquisition project,
which includes the contract, follows an extensive series of steps until it is approved and
signed by the Minister of Defense. These contracts are generally firm fixed-price types.
This is true when defense procurements are based primary on acquiring mature systems.
These mature systems represent advantages not only for the contractor, which minimize
risk in developing new products, but for the Venezuelan Government as well. It is
important to note that during the procurement process the contract receives at least six
revisions from different agencies involved in the process. These revisions are the result
of fears by responsible heads of agencies to be involved in scandals, and lack of
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confidence that contracting personnel have in the process. The following offices perform
these revisions:
Direction of Acquisition of the service or department
D Chief of Service or head of the department
Direction General of Administration of the Ministry of Defense
Comptroller General of the Armed Forces Office
D Legal Consultant of the Minister of Defense
Ministry of Finance ( examines only financial clauses of the contract)
Finally, the Minister of Defense who formally executes the contract signs the
contract, which in Venezuela is a separate document from the technical, financial and
logistic clauses (these are included as annexes to the contract).
6. Management of the Acquisition Process
Before the enactment of the Organic Law of Public Credit, the management of the
acquisition process within the Armed Forces was based on the regulatory instructions
established in the old Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the
Organic Law of the Armed Forces and the Constitution. These laws were very general in
giving instructions for administering the acquisition process, and so each service or
department under the minister of defense had its own means for managing the process. In
1984, the Congress enacted the Organic Law of Public Credit to control government
spending from debt. In the same year, President Jaime Lusinchi signed the Decree 175,
already described in section b. (acquisition phases) in this chapter. In this decree, for the
first time, every simple department involved in the procurement process from the
President to the Minister of Defense received specific instructions to follow during the
procurement process. After that, in 1990 with the enactment of the Bidding Law by
Congress more instructions for accomplishing the procurement process were given to the
Armed Forces. Since then, the Armed Forces adapted the acquisition organization in
order to accomplish the requirements stated in these new regulations. Consequently, each
service included an office for management of the acquisition process by public debt,
office for bidding process and a contract office, all of them depending on the Acquisition
Director.
The Acquisition Director of each service has civilian and military personnel in
these offices with backgrounds in laws, economics, and administration (in the case of
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civilians), and logistics, technology, and administration (in the case of the military).
Civilians receive their degrees from private and governmental universities around the
country. In which case, they are incorporated in the military environment and the defense
procurement process with little or no background in defense matters. Some lawyers are
military officers on active duty, but they represent a minority in the entire lawyer
workforce, and their studies are many times the result of personal effort and not from a
programmed curriculum development. In addition, since the military officers working in
these procurement offices do not have backgrounds in the techniques of writing contracts
or negotiating, they are disadvantaged at the time of contracting. Also, this personnel has
a high rate of turnover as a result of changes in the directors of acquisition who always
bring in their own teams to work in this unique environment. Therefore, the civilians
who are more permanent in their duties normally start a new process of indoctrinating
the new team, which delays the process.
In managing the procurement process, the defense organization lacks the ability
to train the personnel to do the work. The efforts to correct this deficiency always involve
seminars or short courses in specific areas of the process. In addition, senior civilian
employees teach the new trainees on-the-job skills. Additionally, this did not happen
until 1997 when the government started to create computer supported processes and
electronic data interchange. Then the defense organization was included in the new
Platform of Official Information (Platino), which is the connection between the
government and all the national institutions. In addition, the defense procurement
organization was included in an electronically managed bidding system called
"Compita"(Competing) to help manage the procurement process.
Finally, the United Nations included Venezuela in the Integral E-Commerce and
Business Information Network (TIPS), which is a United Nations Development Program,
considered the largest integral and informative e-commerce business network available
for doing business.
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E. SUMMARY OF THIS CHAPTER
In this chapter, the Venezuelan procurement process was described. We saw how
the different frameworks play a role in structuring defense procurement, and also how
some of these frameworks have more influence in the process than others. For example,
the executive power with the figure of the President and the Defense Minister strongly
affects procurement decisions. In addition, we observed the lack of oversight power that
Congress has over the procurement process—some restrictions imposed by law. These
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factors can facilitate corruption and bribery within the defense procurement process. Such
factors will be considered in further analysis of this research.
In the next chapter, I will describe the U.S. procurement process based on the
same frameworks used in this chapter. This will permit a comparative and critical
analysis of the Venezuelan procurement process and will establish the foundation for
developing the findings and conclusions of this work.
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III. THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The study of the U.S. defense acquisition process is a complex undertaking.
Procurement is accomplished by following an extensive procedure that involves a variety
of military and civilian agencies subject to a variety of laws and regulations. In addition,
each one of the Government branches (executive, legislative, and judicial) has a function
to play in the defense procurement process, occasionally affected by divergent objectives
such as economy or politics.
This chapter discusses the U.S. defense procurement using the four frameworks
—
institutional, regulatory, organizational, and procurement offices—considering the
influence that the three branches of the U.S. Government exert in the process.
A. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
1. Congress
The U.S. Congress's central role in policy making can be traced to the writers of
the constitution. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and the others established the
principles for Congress to be the lawmaking body and set out its relationship with the
other branches of the Government [Ref.15: p.l]. Not remarkably, the U.S. Congress
composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives strongly affects the defense
procurement process as both overseer and the only legislative body of the Federal
Government. The General Accounting Office (GAO) helps the Congress with its
oversight function.
As the only legislative body, the U.S. Congress is constitutionally the ultimate
source of funds for the Federal Government (Article 1. U.S. Constitution). Therefore, its
role in defense procurement is fundamental.
Congress has a well-structured organization for studying the U.S. defense
requirements. This organization includes two authorizing committees—the Senate
Armed Service Committee (SASC) and the House National Security Committee (HNSC)
(Former House Armed Services Committee (HASC)); and two appropriation
committees—the House Appropriation Committee (HAC) and the Senate Appropriation
Committee (SAC). These are in addition to the Senate and House of Representatives
Budget Committees. All these committees are involved in different phases of the
congressional defense budget. These different committees use the budget process as a
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way of performing oversight as they hold hearings based on the military requests and
analyze the reasons for a particular project before approving it.
Legislative Oversight
In addition to controlling federal spending, the U.S. Congress enacts the
laws that affect defense procurement. The overall scheme of this process is found in the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1949. Moreover, the legislative oversight of
Congress is also exerted by the enactment of statutes.
Congress constantly revises defense procurement policies and practices
relying on the General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO functions under the
direction of the Comptroller General of the United States and among its responsibilities
are
to audit Government accounts
D to settle and to adjust claims by and against the U.S.
to decide merits and protest regarding contract awards or proposed awards
to present audit reports on the efficiency and effectiveness of defense
operations including procurement
The Comptroller General also prepares determinations on a contractor's
protest against a Government agency. These determinations are published as
"Comptroller General Decisions" and often function as precedents for interpreting
statutes and other laws.
The Government Operations Committees within Congress supplement the
activities of the GAO. First, they review the GAO reports and make recommendations to
Congress, and second, they conduct their own studies on defense procurement projects.
2. Executive
The executive branch headed by the President of the U.S. also plays several major
roles in defense procurement. Among others, these roles include:
to develop plans, programs and budgets to be considered by Congress
D to execute budgets and to implement the plans and programs approved by
Congress
to supplement statutory acquisition policies and procedures through such
means such as Executive Orders
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to appoint agency heads and other officials who have direct or indirect
management control over acquisition programs
The President as the head of the executive branch can establish policies and
procedures for defense procurement by the mean of Executive Orders. The Executive
Orders (E.O.) stay in effect unless rescinded by the President. Two recent and important
executive orders are the E.O. 12352 & E.O. 12931 "Federal Procurement Reform," dated
March 17, 1982 and October 13, 1994, respectively. The first order directs agency heads
to assign a Procurement Executive with agency responsibility to oversee the agency's
procurement goal and guidelines and to measure and evaluate procurement office
performance. The second E.O. prescribes other measures to streamline procurement
systems and to ensure that the procurement focuses on customer needs. The latter E.O.
also mandates agency heads to establish career education programs for procurement
professionals, including requirements for successful completion.
The President can also use the E.O. as a means to achieve economic and social
policy goals. One example of this is the E.O. 12138, which encourages the awarding of
subcontracts under federal prime contracts to women-owned enterprises.
Executive Departments and Agencies
The Secretary of Defense as well as the secretaries and heads of the
various military departments—through congressional delegation—have the power to
make major procurement decisions affecting their departments. The Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947 grants the secretaries of the military services the authority to
make procurement decisions and underlines the guidance for making such decisions. In
addition, other civilian agencies are also performing an important role in the defense
acquisition process. Among them, I found:
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
D The Office of Federal Procurement Policy
The Board of Contract Appeals
The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council
The Defense Acquisition Regulations Council
D The Attorney General of the U.S.




The judicial branch is constitutionally responsible for all legal cases that involve
the Government. This occurs when the contracting officer or Board of Contract Appeals
cannot administratively settle a dispute between the Government (represented by the
Contracting Officer [CO]) and one of the contractors under the terms established in the
contract. In this case, the issue is taken to court. The court resolves such disputes based
on Federal Statutes, case law, and the terms and conditions of the contract. The judicial
branch has the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims and as a last resource for claims the U.S. Supreme Court.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims are the result of the enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.
The latter obtained its actual name from the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992
[Ref.16: p.21-2]. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of
the Boards of Contract Appeals and the Court of Federal Claims. The Court of Federal
Claims can directly receive a contractor's claim from CO's decisions. Moreover, the
Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction to grant complete relief on any contract claim
brought forth before the contract is awarded. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has the
authority to rule final decisions in contract disputes. This last step is rarely exerted in
defense procurement. Under the U.S. judicial system, the contractor has two ways for
claiming disputes. Figure 4, which follows, explains graphically the dispute process:
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Figure 4. U.S. Dispute Process
B. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The authority for the Department of Defense to conduct systems acquisitions (i.e.,
to develop, produce, and field weapon systems) proceeds from three levels of the
regulatory framework, which are discussed in the following sections.
1. The Constitution
As stated earlier, the U.S. Constitution empowers the three different branches of
the Government to act by different means and to set rules for the defense procurement
process. Even though the U.S. Constitution specifically does not describe the power for
the government to enter contracts, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Government




The statutory authority of Congress provides the legal basis for defense
procurement in the U.S. Some of the most prominent laws affecting defense procurement
are
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, now essentially replaced by
subsequent legislation
D Small Business Act (1963), as amended
Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (1983), as amended
Competition in Contracting Act (1984)
D DOD Procurement Reform Act (1985)
DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols)
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994
D Title 10, United States Code (U.S. Armed Forces and DOD Organization)
D Annual Authorization and Appropriation bills, which in recent years have
contained substantial changes in statutory requirements.
All these laws provide the second level of the regulatory framework in the
defense organization. They are necessary because of the unique status of the Government
(the Government as a sovereign body has special powers and immunities but also has
unique limitations in its contractual authority).
3. Regulations
The third level of the regulatory framework emanates from the executive branch
in the form of executive orders, national security and presidential decision directives, and
other departmental or agency regulations. Some examples include:
Executive Order (E.O.) 12352 (1982), which mandated procurement reforms
and the establishment of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
D National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 (1986), which directed
implementation of recommendations of the President's Blue Ribbon (Packard)
Commission on Defense Management9
9 The Packard Commission named for its Chairman David Packard, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense,
recommended in 1986 among other suggestions the establishment of an Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition) now the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD [A & T]).
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National Security Review (NSR) 1 1 (1989), which directed the Defense
Management Review and Subsequent Defense Management Report to the
President
D OMB Circular A-109 (April 5,1976). This circular establishes policies to be
followed by executive branch agencies in the acquisition of major systems.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), (1984). This document
consolidated the major procurement regulations of various departments and
agencies to decrease the volume of regulatory guidance. The FAR applies to
the acquisition of all goods and services and is the primary set of regulations
for all executive agencies.
D Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS), which applies to all of the military and
DOD agencies, was completely re-written in 1991 to eliminate unnecessary
text and clauses, to modify thresholds and other burdens for contracting
officers. The DFARS is supplemented from time to time by the issuance of
Defense Acquisition Circulars.
D DOD 5000 series, March 15, 1996. These directives incorporate new laws
and policies, separate mandatory policies from discretionary practices, and
integrate for the first time acquisition policies and procedures for both
automated information systems (AISs) and major weapon systems.
Agency heads are empowered by statute or by presidential order to prepare and
issue rules and regulations. The Government is required under the Administrative
Procedures Act to publish most, but not all, the rules and regulations in two publications.
First, the daily Federal Register that provides a uniform system for making regulations
and legal notices issued by the Federal Government available to the public. And second,
the Code of Federal Regulation, which is a catalog or codification of the rules (published
in the Federal Register) concerning the Government.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Not only is the Department of Defense organization involved in the procurement
process, but other civilian agencies in the executive branch, as well as some offices of the
legislative, are also actively immersed in this complex process. This section describes
the most important offices in the process.
1. Department of Defense (DOD)
The organization of the military departments is partially prescribed by statute. The
DOD includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of Joint Chief of
Staff, the military departments, the unified commands, and other agencies, such as the
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Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Defense Logistic Agency. All these defense
organizations play a role in defense procurement.
The Department of Defense, considered the biggest purchaser in the world, had
380,615 persons employed in its acquisition organization at the end of fiscal year 1995
[Ref.17]. The functional area of procurement in this huge organization is managed at the
secretariat level by an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD
[A &T]), who is a statutory appointee. Procurement operational responsibility is
generally decentralized to the military services. Research and development (R&D)
policies and procedures are under the responsibility of the service assistant secretaries for
R&D. The responsibility for research, development and acquisition of hardware and for
other logistics aspects is generally delegated to major commands.
Within DOD certain major commanders are designated as the "head of the
agency." These commanders delegate their authority, except critical functions, to
contracting activities. This authority is further delegated to the contracting officers. 10
The DOD 5000 series establishes the monetary thresholds and, based on these thresholds
establishes the level of management and responsibilities for the procurement process.
2. Head of Services
The agency head establishes overall agency policies, appoints persons to fill key
positions, and has "unlimited" (subject to thresholds) acquisition authority. The agency
head sometimes makes essential acquisition decisions, such as in source selection.
Agency heads must also warrant that planning, programming and budgeting systems are
established to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the acquisition function.
3. The Defense Logistic Agency
The Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) provides consumables, supply items, and
logistic services common to the military services. The DLA provides contract
administration services through its branch, the Defense Contract Management Command
(formerly the Defense Contract Administration Service).
10 The Contracting Officer (CO) is the essential operational person in the defense acquisition process. A
CO may have the authority to enter into, administer or end contracts. The fundamental authority and
responsibilities of the CO are found in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR 1.6).
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4. The Defense Contract Audit Agency
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)—initiated in 1965
—
performs
contract audit functions and provides accounting and financial advisory services for all
DOD components, as well as for other government agencies. The DCAA provides
services related to negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts and
subcontracts, as well as defective pricing and fraud situations.
5. The Office of Management and Budget
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recommends, monitors, and
adjusts programs and funding levels for those programs. It is also responsible for
consolidating the federal budget to be presented by the President to Congress.
6. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) which is part of the OMB has
an administrator appointed by the President. Its overall function is to provide direction of
procurement policy and leadership in the development of procurement systems of the
executive agencies. This office also prescribes Government procurement regulations,
procedures and forms when the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council fails to reach an
agreement in a particular procurement policy.
7. The Board of Contract Appeals
The Board of Contract Appeals (BCA) has statutory authority granted by the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990. The board, which is established by each
major agency, has the authority to resolve contract disputes between a contractor and the
contracting officer (CO).
8. The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council
This council consists of the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, the
Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of National Aeronautics and Space, and the
Administrator of General Services. The council assists in the direction of Government-
wide procurement policies and regulatory activities in the federal government.
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9. The Attorney General of the U.S.
The Attorney General of the United States represents the executive branch of the
Government in matters pertaining to the constitutional aspects of acquisition legislation
or in the prosecution of acquisition-related fraud.
D. PROCUREMENT PROCESS
1. Focus
The 1996 revision of the DOD 5000 series marked a major milestone in the
defense procurement process. The intent of this revision, as stated by Dr. Paul Kaminsky
(USD [A&T]), is, "to define an acquisition environment in order to make the DOD the
smartest, most responsive buyer of the best goods and services, meeting the needs of the
warfighter at the best dollar value over the life of the product." [Ref.18: P.l]. The U.S.
defense procurement process is focused nowadays on modernizing and replacing the
aging systems and, by this means, maintaining the U.S. supremacy worldwide.
2. Acquisition Phases
All military systems acquisitions are based upon a need or requirement. The
identification of the requirement often results from analyzing potential enemy's
capabilities in relation to our own. This threat analysis and capability assessment would
lead to concept studies to meet the mission need. It is important to note that today's U.S.
defense organization does not automatically acquire new weaponry to counter a threat
because such a reaction is the most costly option. Other preferred options before purchase
are changing doctrine, training and tactics.
The U.S. acquisition process is divided into "phases" and "milestones." As stated
previously, the process starts with a determination of mission needs. Then the process is
subdivided into milestones and phases. The milestones are the decision points that
separate the phases of an acquisition program. Four major milestones exist:
Milestone O, the approval to conduct concept studies
Milestone I, the approval to begin a new acquisition program
D Milestone II, the approval to enter engineering and manufacturing
development
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Milestone III, the approval to produce / deploy and to field the weapon
system
The approval of each one of these milestones permits the project to move to the
following phase. These milestones are part of the decision making process of the
Acquisition Executives responsible for the procurement. The milestone decision
authority with these responsibilities is defined by the DoD 5000.2-R. This directive
establishes acquisition categories (ACAT) based on monetary thresholds in both research
and development and procurement costs. These acquisition categories are defined in
fisure 5, as follows:
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Acquisition Categories
(Does Not Include Automated Information systems)
1 Acquisition Decision Authority Threshold
Category
ACATI DAB Review
Designated by the USD
Decision by USD (A&T)
$335 Million
RDT. & E. or
$2.135B
Procurement
ACAT IC Component Review




RDT. & E. or
$2,135 B.
Procurement





RDT. & E. or
$645 Million
Procurement
ACAT III Does not meet ACAT 1 ,





Figure 5. U.S. Acquisition Categories (from DOD regulation 5000.2-R)
The acquisition phases are all the tasks and activities needed to bring a program to
the next major milestone during an acquisition process. Phases provide a logical means
of progressively translating broadly stated mission needs into well-defined, system-
specific requirements and ultimately into operational, effective, suitable and survivable
systems. These acquisition phases are
Phase O, Concept Exploration
D Phase I, Program Definition and Risk Reduction
Phase II, Engineering and Manufacturing Development
D Phase III, Production, Fielding/Deployment and Operational Support
Finally, it is important to note that during the Concept Exploration phase these
alternatives are studied:
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first, Product Improvement Programs (an actual improvement of existing
weapon systems)
second, Service Life Extension Programs (to extent the useful life of an
existing item)
third, non-developmental or commercial items (another service has the item or
can be found in the commercial sector)
3. Funding
Since 1961, the formal process that the Department of Defense has followed in
preparing its budget has been known as the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS). Until recently this process was made annually, but in 1985, Congress
mandated a change to a biennial budget. As a result the DOD now goes through the
whole PPBS process only every other year. [Ref.l9:p. crs-24, 25, 26, 27]
The PPBS process is designated not only to prepare the budget for submission but
also for a long-term financial plan. This long-term financial plan extended over a period
of six to eight years is called the "Future Years Defense Program" (FYDP). The PPBS
process can be divided into three different phases:
First, the Planning Phase: This is designed to integrate assessments of potential
military threats facing the country. Here, many factors such as national strategy and
defense policy play important roles in writing the final document, which is the Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG). This DPG provides the basic rationale for the DOD programs
and budget.
Second, the Programming Phase: Here each military service prepares a Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) which details the specific needs in programs and forces
of each service to accomplish the stated DPG. This POM is revised by the Defense
Resources Board (DRB) and appealed by the services. The final revision and approval
generates the Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) that the Secretary of Defense
approves and signs.
Third is the Budget Phase: The services and agencies prepare their budgets,
which OSD then reviews and modifies through Program Budget Decisions. The DOD
Budget Estimate Submission (BES) is sent to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) in October. At OMB it is reviewed, adjusted and merged with the rest of the
Government's budget request. The President's Budget is sent to Congress in February
for Congressional action.
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The submission of the President's Budget is followed by congressional action.
Congress provides funds for defense programs mainly by appropriating funds in annual
appropriation acts, including the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, the Military
Construction Appropriation Act and other appropriation laws. Congress also authorizes
annual defense programs through the Defense Authorization Act.
4. Procurement Methods and Source Selection
Since the enactment of the Competition in Contracting act of 1984 (CICA), "full
and open competition has become the byword of all government procurement." [Ref.20:
p.2-16.]. This goal is reached primarily by using sealed bidding and competitive
proposals, the two basic methods of procurement. The CICA requires that procuring
agencies acquire materiel "competitively." This mean that the procurement agencies must
solicit sealed bids when time permits. The award will be made on the basis of price and
other than price-related factors, and it is not necessary to conduct discussions with the
responding sources. In a competitive proposal, the contracting officer considers among
other factors, the offeror's particular experience with what is being procured, the
offeror's technical and management capability, the available and reliable cost
information, and the contact type the offeror is willing to accept.
Finally, there is a third type of procurement called non-competitive. Non-
competitive contracts are allowed under Federal Acquisition Regulation but are
exclusively subject to seven circumstances:
D The property or service is available from only one single source.
The agency's needs are so urgent that the Government's interest can be
seriously affected.
D An award to a particular contractor is necessary to maintain that source in case
of national emergency.
D The terms of an agreement or treaty between the U.S. and a foreign
government or organization have the effect of requiring the use of non-
competitive procedures.
D The law expressly authorizes that procurement to be made from a specified
source, or the agency's need for a brand-name commercial item for
authorized resale.
National security would be compromised.
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The agency determines that non-competitive procedures are necessary in the
public interest and provides Congress with written notice of its determination
at least 30 days before contract award.
A contracting officer must follow certain procedures before making procurements
by non-competitive contracts. The contracting officer must justify the use of non-
competitive contracts in writing, certifying the accuracy and completeness of the
justification and obtaining the necessary approvals. (For example, for contracts over $10
million, approval from the agency acquisition executive is required).
The source selection process is used by the U.S. defense acquisition organization
in competitive, negotiated contracting to select the proposal offering the most
advantageous alternative to the DOD. There are two approaches, which can be used to
select the most advantageous alternative to DOD. These approaches are either the
"lowest cost" proposal or "best value" proposal.
In many instances, using the "lowest cost" acceptable proposal approach results in
selecting the most advantageous alternative. In this approach the contracting officer
states the minimum requirement in the solicitation, describes the information that the
offerors must submit for evaluation, and uses a "go-no-go" (pass/fail) evaluation of the
technical proposals. Finally, the contracting officer grants and awards a contract to the
responsible offeror that submits a technically acceptable proposal at the lowest evaluated
cost. This source selection is normally used when the contracting officer is using sealed
bidding negotiation.
The "best value" approach permits greater flexibility to use sound business
judgment in weighing non-cost factors against costs in selecting the proposal that best
meets the DOD needs. This approach also permits access to information about a
potential offeror that exceeds the price alone. This can provide a better understanding of
how an offeror intents to meet delivery, quality, and performance requirements at the
offered price and increase the likelihood of selecting quality suppliers.
5. Contracts
Most of the federal contracts are fixed price. This means that the Government
pays a fixed sum of money, previously stipulated in the contract, to the contractor as a
consequence for performance. Other contracts are cost reimbursable. These occur when
the Government reimburses the contractor for the allowable incurred costs of
performance. There are numerous variations to these two contract types to fit the
circumstances.
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Normally, the Contracting Officer (CO) selects a contract type, considering the
risk inherent in the acquisition, and then identifying the type of contract that would
mitigate the risk for both the Government and the contractor. The CO also must
determine whether that contract type would be proper under the circumstances, given
certain limitations on its use. The following is a list of the main contract types used by
COs:
firm fixed price
D fixed price with economic price adjustment
fixed price award fee
D fixed price redeterminable
fixed price incentive
cost plus fixed fee
cost plus incentive fee
D cost plus award fee
cost and cost sharing
D time and material and labor hours
D combinations of two or more of the above compensation arrangements in the
same contract.
E. MANAGEMENT OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Since the establishment of the DOD under the guidance of the National Security
Act of 1947, several attempts have taken place to reform and streamline the acquisition
management process. Several executive branch commissions have studied the problems
associated with defense acquisition. However, it was not until 1991 with the passage of
the Department of Defense Authorization Act that the first steps were taken to really
change the U.S. defense acquisition process [Ref.21: p. 1 1].
The Authorization Act called for the establishment of a panel of experts from
government and private industry to study the laws directing defense procurement and to
propose to Congress a set of relevant acquisition laws in 1993. The panel gave its report
which, basically concentrated on changes that would help streamline the acquisition
process throughout the 1990s.
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Many of the panel's recommendation were implemented via subsequent
legislation. The most notable examples are the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
(FASA) of 1994 and the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act. The FASA made
many changes in the acquisition process and affected considerably contracting
procedures. Some of these changes include emphasizing the use of Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI) for the solicitation and award of government contracts. In addition to
this, Secretary of Defense William Perry while in office took various steps to improve the
defense procurement process. Policy memos from the USD (A&T) implemented most of
these changes.
These policies include the institutionalization of Integrated Product and Process
Development (IPPD) and Integrated Product Teams (IPT) which permit a better
understanding between contractors and program managers, emphasis on the use of
commercial specifications and standards, implementation of performance-based
specifications, and recognition of Cost as an Independent Variable (CArV).
Using these management tools, which include improved communications and
more efficient processes, the DOD is changing acquisition. Such changes will continue
because the Congress is asking for acquisition workforce reductions, so the DOD is
trying to provide the warfighters with the best products in the most timely manner
possible under severe budget constraints.
F. SUMMARY OF THIS CHAPTER
Unlike the Venezuelan process, we saw in this chapter how the U.S. Congress
powerfully controls the defense procurement process. In addition, I described how not
only a particular office such as the GAO exerts this control but also how special
committees within Congress control the budgeting process. This oversight control leads
to lengthy legislative discussions often with political overtones or influence, yet this
oversight control certainly reduces the opportunity for the Military to make illegal
practices within the procurement process. Because of this oversight control, the DOD is
seeking ways to legally streamline the procurement process in order to make it even
faster and more efficient, as I explained in the last part of this chapter.
In the following chapter I will compare and analyze the two processes already




IV. COMPARISON AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
VENEZUELA ARMED FORCES ACQUISITION PROCESS
A. COMPARING THE VENEZUELAN AND U.S. ACQUISITION PROCESSES
This chapter uses the frameworks presented previously to analyze the Venezuelan
acquisition process by comparing it with the U.S. process.
This approach enables a clearer comparison and contrast of the procurement
process in both nations despite some considerations such as Armed Forces dimensions.
No single country can approach the size and dimensions of the United State's
defense establishment as it relates to the number of weapon systems, the size of the
forces, the money spent on defense procurement or maintenance, and other comparative
measures, such as expenditures in research and development [Ref.22: p.4]. Thus,
comparing the U.S. procurement process to other nations is difficult due to the immense
differences in size and resources. More specifically, comparing the U.S. and the
Venezuelan acquisition process is even more laborious, owing to vast differences in
legislation, geography, culture, and even national security.
B. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
1. Congress
In republican systems, such as in Venezuela, the legislature exacts accountability
for the public administration "after the fact" rather than "during." This is not the case in
the Federal system of the U.S. where Congress exerts control during and after the public
administration. The Venezuelan Congress oversees neither the acquisition of weapon
systems or other procurements classified as security and defense expenditures. 1 l Also the
Venezuelan Constitution differs enormously from the U.S. Constitution in assigning
Congress control of the Armed Forces. In fact, the Venezuelan Congress has a limited
role in the management of the Armed Forces. Within its authority, Venezuela's Congress
can permit overseas military missions when the executive branch requires it, approves the
promotion of high-ranking officers, and initiates the process and final approval of the
'
' Security and Defense expenditures are classified as "secret" by the Central Office of Budget (Oficina
Central de Presupuesto OCEPRE), and they receive a special treatment in the Venezuelan Budgetary
process. The OCEPRE is the equivalent office to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
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budget. In contrast, the U.S. Constitution states that Congress has the power to form and
sustain the Armed Forces and to elaborate the rules for managing them. These
differences mandated by the constitutions are easily observed in the structures that both
the U.S. and Venezuelan Congresses have for managing defense affairs. These immense






































Figure 6. Comparison between the U.S. and Venezuelan Congress Structures Affecting
the Acquisition Process in Both Countries.
The Venezuelan Constitution states in its Article 190 that the President exerts the
supreme hierarchical authority of the Armed Forces and consequently organizes, governs,
administers, and deploys them. This article is reaffirmed in the organic law of the Armed
Forces of Venezuela (Chapter III, Section 1, Article 54). From these basic laws, many
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administers, and deploys them. This article is reaffirmed in the organic law of the Armed
Forces of Venezuela (Chapter III, Section 1, Article 54). From these basic laws, many
Venezuelan legislators believe that the connection between Congress and the Armed
Forces is based solely on approving documents but not on really overseeing or restricting
them. Thus, the political control that the Venezuelan Congress exerts over the Armed
Forces is slight [Ref.23.]. Also, in Venezuela the obsession of the so-called "military
secret" 12 has eroded Congress' participation in military affairs and increased the distance
between the civil and military sectors, which means evaluating and controlling the Armed
Forces is difficult [Ref.24]. As a result, Congress then plays a secondary role in
formulating defense policies and in controlling military expenditures. This situation has
a clear influence in permitting bribery and corruption among the military since Congress
does not exert effective control over the military.
Legislative Oversight
The limited role of the Venezuelan Congress in defense procurement
contrasts clearly with the U.S. constitutional arrangement in which broad responsibilities
are assigned to the legislative branch: The U.S. Congress can both initiate defense related
legislation and significantly modify its overall direction, as well as the administration of
the specific details of national security policy. Clearly, the U.S. Congress enacts the laws
that directly govern the Department of Defense (DOD) procurement. Although the
Venezuelan Congress also enacts such laws, its oversight power is diminished when the
expenditures or budgets are classified as security and defense. The Comptroller General
Office, as an auxiliary of the Venezuelan Congress, has the legal authority to exercise
internal and external control of the public administration, including the Ministry of
Defense (MOD); however, expenditures, such as weapon acquisitions, designated to the
security and defense of the state will be exempt from the control regulations established
in the Organic Controller Law (Title III, Chapter 1, Article 36). In this way, the Congress
loses its oversight control which is gained by the Comptroller General of the Armed
Forces, the Minister of Defense, and the President.
This legislation excludes the orders for payment which is revised by the
Comptroller General of Venezuela in order to verify whether the expenditures were
charged to funds approved in the budget or charged to additional debts after the budget
12 The Security and Defense Law establishes in its Title 1 Article 4 that all the documents and other
information related to the security and defense of the nation will be considered "secret" and their
dissemination will be illegitimate.
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and legally accorded. This situation generates a second cause for fraud or corruption
among the military during the defense procurement process in Venezuela.
In contrast, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has an active role
in the DOD contracting process. Its influence is notorious because it audits efficiency
and effectiveness of the defense acquisition processes and maintains oversight and
auditing control of defense contracts in progress. In addition, the GAO has the power to
decide the merits of protests for both contracts and proposed awards. However, in the
Venezuelan case, the administrative courts of the Republic resolve protest by the
contractor in the bidding process and the verdict can be appealed before the Supreme
Court. If irregularities by the participants (contractor or public official) are proven, the
Comptroller Office 13 sanctions the violators of the bidding process.
It is important to note that, as a result of many scandals in defense
procurements, due, in part, to the two reasons earlier mentioned—lack of oversight
control by Congress—the Venezuelan Congress is now seeking ways to oversee the
defense procurement process. For example, in the last three years Congress has called for
hearings in which the Commanders in Chief of different services must give reasons for
acquiring and maintaining weapon systems and to explain the costs for these procurement
actions.
2. Executive
The Venezuelan President, as the highest authority of the Armed Forces, also has
the final decision in determining whether or not to proceed with a defense acquisition.
However, prior to this, the overall responsibility rests with the Minister of Defense.
Likewise the US. Congress has directly delegated many contractual powers to the
President through the Defense Production Act of 1950, which empowers the President to
oversee the defense industry and to obtain supplies in case of a national emergency.
Nonetheless, this power is rarely exercised. In the case of Venezuela, the President can
exercise this power based on the Organic Law of Security and Defense (Chapter II, Title
VI, Article 31). In both countries, the Presidents exercise their power to achieve the
desired social and economic policy goals. Yet despite this last fact and because the
defense industrial base in Venezuela is scarce, most of the business for contracting
defense weapon systems goes to foreign industrialized countries.
13 The General Comptroller of Venezuela is the authority for applying sanctions in the bidding process
when the funds are classified as ordinary (Bidding Law, Chapter VII, Article 68.)
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Whereas the Venezuelan Constitution empowers the President to dictate the
application of the laws, the U.S. Constitution does not give this power to the President.
Yet, the U.S. President exercises executive orders, which set forth policies or rules
regarding acquisition policies. In Venezuela, the President can also exercise this power
by way of decrees. In addition to this power and according to the Organic Law of the
Armed Forces, the Venezuelan President has the authority to appoint the Comptroller
General of the Armed Forces who is responsible for overseeing and controlling the
Defense Acquisition Process ("Secret Funds")- The President, the Minister of Defense
and the Comptroller General of the Armed Forces are legally responsible for the overall
acquisition process and all expenditures for security and defense.
Executive Department and Agencies
In Venezuela, far different from the U.S., the Minister of Defense is an
active-duty Major General or Admiral who is appointed by the President. This official,
within the public administration, is the overall responsible agent for the defense
acquisition process. This differs enormously from the U.S. defense acquisition process in
which the Defense Acquisition Executive 14 is a civilian. The Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology (USD [A&T]) is the Acquisition Executive who is
responsible for defense procurements. Each of the Services Components Acquisition
Executives are assistant secretaries of that service. They have the power of delegation.
In Venezuela, where the Commanders-in-Chief of each military component are active
duty Major Generals or Admirals, the Minister of Defense can delegate the authority for
acquisition to one of his Commanders, except when the acquisition funds are obtained by
means of public debt.
The U.S. Department of Defense has among its military agencies the
Armed Services Board of Contracts Appeals, the Defense Acquisition Regulation
Council—and under the Office of Management and Budget—the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy. All these organizations exercise rules and regulations in the defense
acquisition process. None of these organizations has a counterpart in Venezuela with the
exception of the Comptroller General of the Armed Forces.
The Joint General Staff of the Venezuelan Armed Forces serves as
advisory body to the Minister of Defense in decisions on acquisition matters. This
function is similar to the function covered by the U.S. Defense Acquisition Board which
14 The Acquisition Executive is the individual within the Department of Defense charged with the overall
acquisition management responsibilities.
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advises the USD (A &T) on major decisions regarding individual acquisition programs,
specifically, and acquisition policies and procedures, generally [Ref.25: p. 10].
In the case of the Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS), the
Minister of Defense of Venezuela is required to carry out the regulations established by
the Central Office of Statistics and Information Systems (Oficina Central de Estadisticas
e Informatica, OCEI), which is a subordinated office of the presidency. This differs from
the U.S. where the MAIS are acquired under the guidance of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD[C3I]). The
acquisition executive for Automated Information Systems (AISs) establishes policies and
procedures unique for AISs and, also, chairs the Major Automated Information Systems
Review Council.
3. Judicial
The judicial branch of the government in both countries also affects defense
acquisition processes. For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the
U.S. Court Federal Claims, and to a lesser extent, the U.S. Supreme Court are
constitutionally responsible for making judicial decisions affecting procurement in the
U.S. In Venezuela the Administrative Courts of the Republic, the Superior Courts of
Safeguard and Public Patrimony and the Venezuela's Supreme Court are actively
involved in influencing the procurement processes.
In the U.S., the defense contractor has options to dispute contracts. First, after a
final decision by the contracting officer and without obtaining a negotiated settlement,
the contractor can appeal to the U.S. Federal Court of Claims or to the Defense Board of
Contract Appeals. Then, the contractor can appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit before the case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court. In Venezuela, until recently,
only one option existed to proceed in the cases of claims or contract disputes. This
process was, basically, to introduce a contractor claim into the First Instance
Administrative Courts of the Republic. 15 Then, the claimant had two opportunities to
appeal before turning to the Supreme Court.
On March 25, 1998, the Venezuelan Congress enacted the Arbitration
Commercial Law which states "the Arbitration Accord" where both parties in dispute
agree to submit under arbitration "the differences with respect to a contractual
15 The First Instance Administrative Courts of Venezuela are the first level courts for introducing
negotiations or administrative claims against the government by any particular person or organization.
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of disputes and averts litigation, is also increasing since the Administrative Disputes
Resolution Act of 1990. 16
Under U.S. laws, in the case of protest during the awarding of a contract or after
a contract has been awarded, the contractors can pursue a settlement. First, the contractor
takes action within the applicable DOD agency, and then can file a protest with the
Comptroller General (GAO), Small Business Administration (if applicable). Finally, the
case may go before the U.S. Courts. In Venezuela, the contractor can also file a protest
before the Comptroller General of the Republic and according to the Bidding Law, the
Comptroller General can cancel the award and can apply sanctions if applicable. [Ref.27:
p.22] Also, the contractor can file a protest before the Administrative Courts of the
Republic.
In Venezuela, as a consequence of corruption cases and bribery affecting defense
procurements and government contracting, the Congress enacted the Organic Law of
Safeguard of the Public Patrimony (Ley Organica de Patrimonio Publico) to prevent, to
pursue, and to sanction all public administration officials, contractors and public
employees in corruption cases. This law, enacted in 1982, created the Superior Courts of
Safeguard and Public Patrimony. For the first time that particular law served as a basis
for impeachment and suit against the Venezuelan President, Carlos Andres Perez, in
1993.
4. Summary of the Institutional Framework
In this section of the chapter we saw how the Legislative power of the U.S. exerts
very strict controls over the defense procurement activities of the DOD. This contrasts
with the weak oversight situation that the legislative possesses in Venezuela defense
procurement. Also, we saw how the military in Venezuela has more influence in
procurement decisions contrasting with the U.S. process where review boards, heads of
departments or acquisition executives are mostly civilian and make the important
decisions in the procurement process. Additionally, it is important to highlight the intent
of the Venezuelan Congress to reduce bribery and corruption by enacting the Organic
Law of Safeguard and Public Patrimony in 1982.
16 The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 defines the alternative dispute resolution as any procedure that
is used instead of litigation to resolve issues in controversy, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation,
mediation, fact-finding, mini-trials, and arbitration, or any combination thereof.
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C. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Naturally, in both Venezuela and the U.S., the defense procurement is based on
regulations and since public funds are obligated and expended for public purposes, these
regulations play an important role in the defense acquisition process.
1. Constitution
The Constitution as the supreme law in both countries is considered first for
regulating the defense acquisition process. In Venezuela, the Constitution states that the
Government has the authority, with the approval of Congress, to enter into contractual
agreements involving the national interest. Also, the Constitution dictates that any
contract with public funds must have a clause that empowers the courts of the republic to
solve any dispute or controversy and could not be solved amicably [Ref.28: p.23].
In the U.S., although the constitution does not address whether the Government
has the right to enter into contracts, the Supreme Court in a "landmark" decision (United
States versus Tingery, 1831), declared that the federal government has the inherent
power, based on sovereignty, to enter into contracts and has the implied powers, as
necessary, to properly perform of its duties [Ref.29: p.3-3]. The Supreme Court also
gave guidelines to the public for determining the legitimacy of the Government to
contract. This means that the Government has, now and then, the legitimate authority to
contract, if it is represented by an authorized official.
2. Statutes
In the U.S., the term statute applies to the laws enacted by the legislative branch
of the government and signed by the President. In Venezuela, these laws are called
organic laws, and are also enacted by Congress and signed by the President. The Organic
Law is identified by its name (i.e. Organic Law of Labor). This is different in the U.S.
where the law receives a public law number and is then included in the U.S. Codes.
Furthermore, in Venezuela, the Organic Law must be published in the Official Gazette in
order to be valid.
Many statutes in the U.S. prescribe policies for defense acquisitions. For
example, annually the appropriation and authorization bills contain numerous policies
regarding defense acquisition. The most fundamental of these bills that contains an
overall policy for the acquisitions is the Office of Procurement Policy Act (41 USC 401).
Venezuela does not have an organic law similar to the Procurement Policy Act.
However, several organic laws, such as the Organic Law of Budgeting Regimen, the
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Organic Law of Central Administration, the Bidding Law, and the Organic Law of the
Armed Forces establish policies regarding acquisition policies and procedures. Also the
Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic further states policies regarding
defense acquisition procedures.
3. Regulations
Regulations, also called administrative laws, provide the third level of acquisition
regulations for both countries. The sources of these regulations are executive orders
signed by the President, rules and regulations established by head of agencies, and
decisions by the Comptroller General and administrative law judges. The sources of such
regulations are similar in both countries. However, in Venezuela, the President also has
the constitutional power to enforce the regulations for each organic law enacted by
Congress. Consequently, the Venezuelan President signs the directives for applying the
organic laws affecting defense procurement.
In the U.S., the basic set of regulations relating to procurement is the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). This FAR is an ever-changing and alterable document
since two councils forcefully maintain it. The Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council
and the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council are the two agencies responsible for this
task. In contrast, Venezuela lacks both a similar regulatory document and similar
organizations. However, the President can sign the directives for applying the law, and
such this deficiency is diminished. Nevertheless, this process is not as intensive or
alterable as the FAR.
The U.S. Department of Defense also has the Defense FAR Supplement
(DFARS), which applies to all of the military and DOD agencies. The DFARS was re-
written by the Department of Defense in 1991 and is supplemented from time to time by
distribution of Defense Acquisition Circulars or departmental letters. In addition, on
March 15, 1996, the U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry signed the DOD revision
and updated directives 5000.1 and 5000.2-R. these directives accomplish four major
objectives:
D incorporate new laws and policies affecting acquisition
separate mandatory policies and procedures from discretionary practices
(DOD 5000. 1 states guiding principles for all Defense Acquisition, and DOD
5000.2R states mandatory policies and procedures for major weapon systems
acquisitions )
eliminate redundant or needless documents and policies within the defense
acquisition agencies
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D integrate, for the first time, acquisition policies and procedures for both
weapon systems and automated information systems
This last change was similar to the situation in Venezuela where procedures for
acquiring weapon systems are separate from automated information systems acquisitions.
The U.S. defense acquisition system is also influenced by the Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-109 (OMB Circular A-109), which establishes policies that the
executive branch agencies must follow to acquire major systems.
The Venezuelan Armed Forces have a directive establishing "Norms for the
Acquisition of Goods and Services to Supply the National Armed Forces" (the
Comptroller General of the Armed Forces, June 13, 1986). This directive was modified
and supplemented by the " Regulation for the Acquisition of Goods and Services for the
National Armed Forces" (June 27, 1988) and the Presidential decree N°175 of " Norms
for the Acquisition of War Materiel and Equipment for the National Armed Forces
Through Credit Public Operations" [Ref.30].
4. Summary of the Regulatory Framework
From analyzing this framework it is simple to see how the U.S. regulatory
systems is a well-structured and continually refined system. Legislators and public
officials are constantly streamlining the procurement process. This situation contrasts
greatly with the Venezuelan regulatory system that has been traditionally lax and is far
more immutable.
D. ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Despite recent downsizing in the U.S. Department of Defense, the DOD is the
biggest purchaser in the world [Ref.31:p.2-13]. For this reason and because mainly
public funds are used for defense expenditures, the DOD is one of the biggest acquisition
organizations in the world. The DOD has as many as 20 acquisition organizations, as well
as a diverse multi-layered workforce. The functional area of procurement is managed at
the secretarial level by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology
who is the statutory appointee. Other agencies, such as the Defense Contract Audit
Agency and the Defense Logistic Agency, are also offices with responsibilities within the
U.S. Defense procurement process. Additionally, procurement offices in the U.S. are
functionally organized according to how procurement authority is delegated.
In Venezuela, the maximum level of responsibility for procurement belongs to the
Minister of Defense. Also, the rest of the organization is structurally affected in the way
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the procurement authority is delegated. As a consequence, each military service has
similar organizations for procurement functions. The Venezuelan Defense Acquisition
Organization does not have a Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) responsible for common
logistic support to each service or to provide contract administration services. The
Venezuelan procurement organization, similar to the DLA in the U.S., is the General
Administration Direction under the Ministry of Defense. However, this office lacks
important functions, such as contract administration and delegates this responsibility to
each service. Another important difference between both acquisition organizations is that
the Venezuelan Acquisition Organization relies on the Comptroller General of the Armed
Forces Office for the overall responsibility of auditing and control. Consequently, each
single contract over a certain monetary threshold must be verified and approved by the
Comptroller General of the Armed Forces Office before being purchased. The goods and
services contracted must also be verified before final acceptance. As a consequence,
delays in contracting and final acceptance occur.
The U.S. defense acquisition organization is also affected by thresholds and
acquisition categories in order to assign the office with oversight responsibility.
Structurally, both the U.S. and the Venezuelan defense acquisition organizations have
more differences than similarities although the primary purpose of obtaining goods and
services for the Armed Forces is the same. The organizational structure of both defense
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By comparing the two organizational charts, we clearly see how the U.S. has
developed a well-defined acquisition organization for supporting the Armed Services.
This includes the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform.
Unfortunately, the Venezuelan Defense Acquisition Organization has been more
inalterable over time. It is also important to note that the U.S. defense acquisition
organization is now under a congressional downsizing. The U.S. Congress in the
Defense Authorization Act for 1996 reduced the acquisition workforce by 20 percent in
all DOD acquisition organizations within a five-year period beginning on October 1,
1995 [Ref.32].
Summary of the Organizational Framework
In this section, we compared the two acquisition organizations and we saw how
the volume and cost of procurement and the use of public funds play an important role in
defining the size of the U.S. DOD acquisition organization. Moreover, we saw how the
Venezuelan defense organization lacks of fundamental organizations that could both
support and improve the procurement process.
E. PROCUREMENT PROCESS
1. Focus
The U.S. defense acquisition strategy affirms: "The US pursue a focused
modernization effort to replace aging systems and incorporate cutting-edge technologies
to ensure continued U.S. military superiority" [Ref.33:p.l]. This statement differs
enormously from the focus that is pursued by the Venezuelan Armed Forces acquisition
process. Venezuela reduces risk in acquisitions by purchasing more mature technologies;
however, both processes have a common goal: to obtain the best product from the
available resources.
After the U.S. Defense Quadrennial Review in May 1997, some changes were
instituted in the U. S. defense acquisition process. First, the need to implement fully the
acquisition reform was led by Dr. Perry, Secretary of Defense, and Dr. Kaminzky, USD
(A&T). This acquisition reform was the foundation for the Federal Acquisition
Streamline Act of 1994, which established four main areas in changing the method of
system acquisitions but not the focus. Theses four areas were
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D First, to implement to the utmost extent superior business practices by
developing integrated product teams, military specifications and standards
reforms, and to consider cost as an independent variable (CAIV).
Second, to redesign DOD business practices in defense acquisition and make
the process "paper-free" and replace "just in case" by "just in time."
D Third, to apply market incentives to improve quality, reduce costs and meet
customers' needs.
Fourth, to reduce support structures and focus in core competencies.
In the case of Venezuela, since 1984, no studies have been conducted to change
the acquisition system or to consider changing the focus of the process. Although
Venezuela's President, Rafael Caldera, signed a decree ordering the restructuring of the
Public Administration [Ref.34:p. 2] on September 14, 1994, no major changes occurred
in the Venezuelan defense acquisition process.
2. Acquisition Phases
Generally speaking, the U.S. and Venezuela follow similar acquisition phases for
their major weapon systems. These U.S. phases include:
D identifying the requirements for new weapon systems
defining alternative weapon systems
D conducting feasibility studies
D designing, developing, testing, producing and fielding systems
This last phase is most similar to Venezuela's system, since most of the weapon
systems acquired for the Venezuelan defense organization are mature products.
The process of identifying the requirements for new weapon systems is quite
similar in both countries. This process is based on determining a need that requires a
materiel solution. In the case of Venezuela, each service is responsible for presenting to
the Minister of Defense the acquisition projects, including logistics, technical and
financing studies, which include a formal analysis on how the project will be used and
how it will meet the needs of the Armed Forces. This project is similar to the Mission
Need Statement (MNS) developed in the U.S. acquisition model; however, here
important differences between the U.S. and Venezuela rise. First, while the MNS is
generic and not system specific, the Venezuelan acquisition project considers two or
more specific products. Second, while the MNS describes the need in broad operational
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terms, the acquisition project requires a specific analysis of how the project will be used
by the service requesting it. Finally, while the MNS is limited to five pages, the
Venezuelan acquisition project is made as extensive as possible in order to justify the
project.
In Venezuela, once the Minister of Defense accepts the project, it is then
submitted to the Joint Staff Office which presents its analysis of the project to the Joint
General Staff of the Armed Forces for opinions and approval by the Venezuelan Defense
Minister. This process obviously differs from the U.S. model where the Joint
Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) validates and approves the MNS, and then the
Defense Acquisition Board helps the USD (A&T) to decide, whether or not, to approve
concept studies, while the Venezuelan Minister decides to procure a defined weapon
system.
From this, it is obvious that the acquisition phases in the Venezuelan process are
highly concentrated and less defined from the beginning, reducing the milestone decision
timeframe, compared to the U.S. model where the four phases and the four milestone
decisions are broader and more specific over time. In figure 8 the two acquisition phases
are compared:
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Marine Corps Acquisition Guide)
However, in the U.S., a project can be "tailored" according to different factors,
such as the maturity of the project or whether or not commercial or non-developmental
items exist to cover the required need. In that case, the process to acquire this type of
mature system can be adjusted from zero to four years until the systems are operational
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and all production evaluations are concluded. Then two or more years are needed for
production and fielding. Together, completing the project can take approximately six to
eight years. This time is computed from approval until the systems are operational and
deployed. A similar cycle of events occurs with the Venezuelan acquisition phases.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that from one milestone to another in the U.S.
acquisition system, the milestone decision authority needs to revise the exit criteria in
order to keep the program sharply focused.
3. Funding
The process for obtaining funds in both countries is generally quite similar. Both
processes start with a planning phase. Then, a programming phase follows, and finally a
budgeting phase, which must have congressional approval, takes place. In this later
phase many differences occur. Also, in developing the Future Years Defense Program,
the U.S. is different since the Venezuelan Armed Forces possess neither similar computer
data bases nor other programs for developing future budgets.
In developing the planning phase, both countries are subject to executive orders.
The U.S Armed Forces are under the President's National Security Strategy and National
Military Strategy. Venezuela's Armed Forces are influenced by Presidential policies and
the Nation's Defense Plan. During the programming phase, the U.S. DOD organization
analyzes the results of the planning into a rational six-year defense program based on the
available resources. In Venezuela, the programming phase is also based on the available
annual resources pre-assigned by the Central Office of Budget (Oficina Central de
Presupuesto, OCEPRE). This occurs when funds for weapons acquisitions come from
the ordinary budget. When the Venezuelan Armed Forces require additional funds, not
provided by the normal budget, the programming phase must include a justification for
the additional money before Congress and the Finances Minister. In the latter case, the
Minister of Defense is only responsible for controlling spending of this additional
money. 17 In both countries, the budgeting phase transforms the programming phase into
a congressional form for approval. However, in the U.S., the Congress exerts more
influence because it defines instructions for planning and expenditures in authorization
and appropriation bills. These instructions can include reducing or increasing weapon
acquisitions, eliminating programs, or establishing acquisition policies. Because the
17 As stated early in this chapter when the acquisition of weapon systems is by public debt the Minister of
Defense will not have power for delegating responsibility, and he will held responsible for contracting the
weapon system (Presidential Decree 175 of June 27,1984).
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Venezuelan Congress lacks experience in the areas of defense, little change occurs. It is
also important to note that in the U.S., the overall responsibility for the budgeting phase
is placed on the U.S. DOD Comptroller. In Venezuela, this responsibility rests with the
Defense Minister and the Defense Finances Director. The Venezuelan Armed Forces
Comptroller has only oversight control over the processes and has no financial power. In
both countries once the budget is enacted by congress, the President signs or vetoes them.
In the Venezuelan case, this Budget is the Budget Law for the current year. In the U.S., it
is called the Defense Appropriation Act for the fiscal year. The U.S. Congress must also
pass a companion Authorization Act to permit the expenditure of funds that have been
appropriated. Additionally, while the Defense Budget in the U.S. Congress is considered
an independent process involving all the defense committees, the Venezuelan Congress
considers the Armed Force's budget with the overall presidential budget.
4. Procurement Methods and Source Selection
In the U.S., since the enactment of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984
(CICA), " full and open competition" has become the motto of the procurement process.
This goal must be reached by the use of sealed bidding and competitive proposals
[Ref.35:p.2-16]. But in Venezuela, the Bidding Law was not promulgated until August
10, 1990, and this law established the procedures for open competition. In Venezuela's
case the bidding can proceed in three forms: a) general (full and open competition); b)
selective, where only capable businesses are invited to bid; and c) direct adjudication,
which is similar to a U.S. noncompetitive contract and which is also developed only
under exceptional circumstances. The first method of procurement is, similar to the U.S.,
a sealed bidding method where all companies are invited to submit their proposals. In this
case, the companies are required to be officially registered as a government contractor in
the Venezuelan Registry of Contractors. 18 In Venezuela, most of the weapon systems
contracts use selective bidding since only capable business organizations world wide are
invited to bid in the procurement process.
The source selection process for procurements in Venezuela is normally based on
technical, operational and financial conditions. Here a difference arises from the U.S.
model. Since the administrative risk to the contractor is not measured, as in the US., a
monetary warranty or premium will be required from the contractor and specified in the
' ° The register of contractors is an office which maintains file of all the government contractors in
Venezuela. This office was established after the enactment of the Bidding Law and became electronically
available on the web for registered users in 1994.
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solicitation. This warranty must be deposited when the contract is awarded. Also, in
Venezuela, the solicitation differs from the U.S. because the solicitation establishes the
general conditions of the bid, the technical, financial, and operational conditions, but not
contract clauses as is the US., where the solicitation documents will actually be the
contract. In the case of Venezuela, the contract is a separate document signed by the
Minister of Defense (or delegated) and the contractor, and includes the technical,
financial and administrative conditions of the solicitation which are annexes to the
contract. Finally, as in the U.S., the Venezuelan procurement process develops the
evaluation factors for contract awards during the solicitation phase, but the process
differs in the US. because price and price-related factors are serious concerns in the
award decision.
5. Contracts
The procurement of most weapon systems in Venezuela is based on buying
mature systems, which represent little risk in research and development. Also, the
contractor can easily estimate the costs. As a consequence, the Venezuelan procurement
process fundamentally develops firm fixed-price contracts. This differs enormously from
the U.S. procurement model because developing products, new weapon systems, and
state-of-art technologies require different types of contracts where both the contractor and
the government share the risk. On the other hand, the U.S. defense procurement process
has developed as many as five contract types and some variations. This is not the case
with Venezuela where the firm fixed-price contract predominates. An important point to
stress is although the U.S. defense procurement agencies attempt to buy non-
developmental items as part of their acquisition reform strategy, many contracts still
involve other than firm fixed prices.
6. Summary of the Procurement Process
Although the Venezuelan procurement process follows similar steps and pursues a
similar purpose to the U.S., the U.S. procurement process has an oversight or milestone
point of control on each phase that involves new funds. This of course represents more
steps and more time frames for the process but establishes control. This is not the case in
Venezuela where the process, may move rapidly, but also generates a high risk for
corruption and bribery.
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F. MANAGEMENT OF THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Many more differences exist in this last area of my comparative analysis. These
differences begin with the structure for managing the procurement process. In the U.S.,
starting with the program manager and ending with the Defense Acquisition Executive,
the DOD facilitates the procurement process. This chain does not exist in Venezuela.
The establishment of acquisition categories, acquisition decision authorities, and
integrated product teams by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, gives the DOD procurement
process a vast difference never seen in the Venezuelan Defense procurement process.
Also, Venezuela's process does not give the contracting officer power to sign contracts.
This is a highly centralized decision placed on the Venezuelan Minister or his delegated
subordinates when applicable. Furthermore, in managing the acquisition programs, the
Venezuelan organization does not have personnel trained in managing defense contracts
or developing acquisition programs. Normally, those jobs are performed by a technical
officer (engineer or armament officer) who has no background in acquisitions or
negotiations. The contracting officer's function is normally performed by a team of
lawyers, without the power to make contract awards. Moreover, the Venezuelan
organization does not have a cost analysis agency capable of helping to develop a well-
defined acquisition strategy and to consider costs as an independent variable (CAIV).
Also, these cost analysts would help the program manager and contracting officer
develop the Earned Value Management Systems (EVMS) criteria (as mandate by DOD
regulation 5000.2-R) during the solicitation phase and provide the basis to oversight
during the execution of a contract. Finally, since the application of the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, and because of using advanced technology in
managing the procurement process, the U.S. has developed an important mechanism to
support the process. This advanced technology includes the Defense Acquisition
Deskbook on CD-ROMs, web page versions, the electronic commerce technologies as
electronic data interchange (EDI), the Electronic Commerce Resource Centers Program
and other such resources. This massive information effort was not adopted in Venezuela
until 1997 when Venezuela entered the Integral E-Commerce and Business Information
Network (TIPS), developed the Platform of Official Information (Platino) and entered
into a commercial electronic bidding system called COMPITA. However, because these
recent advances are really new, personnel do not know that they exist or simply ignore
them.
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Summary of the Management of the Acquisition Process
In this section we saw how the Venezuela defense Organization lack an essential
management chain for streamlining the procurement process. Although the Minister of
Defense centralizes the power for signing contracts, this centralization generates delays
and creates bureaucratic organizations throughout the Ministry of Defense. In addition,
the lack of an organizational office capable of cost analysis support during acquisitions
—
makes the organization vulnerable to contractor prices and increases the possibilities for
overpricing and corruption. Additionally, the low levels (of information technology and
automated-system-resources) add to the bureaucracy. Finally, the absence of well-trained
personnel in the areas of acquisition management and contracting and the high turnover
in manpower debilitates the organization's potential for efficient procurement processes.
G. FACTORS AFFECTING ACQUISITION PROCESSES IN BOTH
COUNTRIES
Based on Krikorian's statement, which began this chapter, the U.S. Department of
Defense is considered the biggest purchasing office in the world with a request in outlays
for the fiscal year 1999 of $252.6 billion. Most of these funds are spent in the U.S.
procurement processes. However, despite this huge amount requested by the President for
the U.S. Armed Forces, some members of Congress strongly believe that much money is
wasted annually by the Armed Forces and since the Warsaw Pact no longer exists, they
believe the Armed Forces do not require such an enormous amount of money. Instead,
Congress calls for downsizing, cost reductions, program cuts and other budget reductions.
The same argument is occurring in Venezuela where Congress believes that Venezuela
requires a new focus on the goals of the Armed Forces, such as their use against
guerrillas and narcotraffic and, consequently, they also ask for budget reductions.
Furthermore, in Venezuela another factor is added to this congressional desire for
reductions in budget spending. The economic crisis that started in Venezuela as a
consequence of the worldwide oil price reductions requires Congress to reduce the budget
in order to avoid increases in the national deficit. Nevertheless, because the main weapon
systems of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are aging, additional credits were approved in
recent years to modernize these, despite the congressional resistance. A similar situation
is confronting the U.S. DOD where in order to maintain supremacy in weaponry
modernization, replacing aging systems is one of the primary objectives of the Secretary
of Defense.
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Another factor affecting both countries' processes and also related to Congress
and politicians is the political lobbying for defense contracts. In the U.S., members of
Congress generally desire defense contracts for their states because they represent
prosperity and benefits. Consequently, they try to obtain and to increase appropriation
money for defense projects within their states. In Venezuela, this does not occur since
most of the defense procurements are foreign. However, bribery and lobbying for
campaign funds for the political parties influence defense procurement.
Finally, in the case of Venezuela, many corruption cases in the defense
procurement process have caused feelings among these politicians and the public that
"something is wrong." As a result, Congress delays assigning funds to defense
procurement programs while tedious and extensive hearings are conducted and the
process is revised over and over again.
H. SUMMARY OF THIS CHAPTER
In this chapter the U.S. and Venezuelan procurement processes were compared
and from this comparative analysis we discovered many deficiencies that degrade the
efficiency of the Venezuelan defense procurement process and facilitate bribery and
corruption.
For example, in this chapter we saw how the legislature in Venezuela is weak in
exercising oversight power over the Armed Forces. Also, we saw how the oversight
function as well as the procurement decision making process is under the control of the
military. This situation contrasts with the U.S. where civilian officials exert the
acquisition decisions and Congress exerts the oversight function within the process. In
addition this chapter showed how the Venezuelan organization is weak in cost analysis
and in this way facilitates the possibilities for overpricing in contracting and bribery
between contractors and acquisition officials. Additionally, the Venezuelan system is
vulnerable for two primary reasons. First, their personnel lack adequate training in
acquisition and are subject to a high turnover rate. Second this generates fraud either
overtly or by acts of omission.
Finally, this chapter shows how the U.S. defense organization simplifies the
procurement process by introducing changes in management, and the regulatory
framework, while the Venezuelan procurement has been more inalterable over time and
with no significant changes in these areas.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS
A. SUMMARY OF THE THESIS
This thesis has presented my view of various aspects of the acquisition processes
in the U.S. and Venezuela in defense organizations. The processes have been compared,
and recognizing that direct comparison between these two countries of widely different
populations, government structure, defense organizations and industrial capabilities is
difficult, some areas of possible improvement have been discussed.
In each one of the frameworks studied, I found relevant aspects that require
development in order to improve to the maximum extent possible the Venezuela's armed
forces acquisition process and to reduce bribery and corruption. These aspects are
discussed in this chapter as they were presented—by frameworks—and they answer to
the primary questions of our research.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS
The actual procedures followed by the two countries for procurement of weapon
systems are, in general, straightforward and follow logical steps from one stage to
another. However, some factors in the Venezuelan defense procurement process must be
revised in order to avoid the corruption and bribery problems already described, and to
make the process more efficient and less bureaucratic. These are our conclusions and
findings from our study.
1. Institutional Framework
In the legislative branch, the Venezuelan Congress lacks effective oversight
power over defense procurement although it has an oversight office with this
responsibility. This weakness is a direct consequence of the restrictions imposed by law
over the Comptroller General of the Republic Office. In addition, most members of the
Defense Commission in both chambers have neither military background nor training in
the areas of defense or national security. Thus, they cannot exert efficient oversight in
the acquisition of weapon systems. This situation has created a crucial deficiency in the
weapons acquisitions processes and has further been a source of corruption within the
military. This conclusion confirms a 1996 study by Bernard Aronson. He said that in
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most Latin American nations there is still no real civilian-military dialogue, and at best
only rudimentary oversight by elected legislatures exist [Ref.36: p A-21].
In the executive area, we saw how a General on active duty runs the Ministry of
Defense with overall responsibilities from approving the initial stages of an acquisition
process until signing the contract. This represents vast powers centralized in only one
military person. Of course a situation like this facilitates the possibility that contractors
can commit bribery and a Minister can be corrupt. This is a clearly contrasting situation
with the U.S. where the Secretary of Defense and his service secretaries—who are
responsible for acquisition, personnel, and policy matters—are civilians and the review
boards are composed of both civilians and the military. In addition, the four Venezuelan
military services are also under the direction of general and flag officers. Consequently,
one must conclude that there is little civilian control of the military. The President, as the
constitutional Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, exercises the only civilian
control over the Armed Forces but with little influence in the procurement process and
his decisions are highly influenced by the military. Additionally, this situation of having
senior military officers occupying these important positions creates a high level of
personnel turnover due to the normal process of a military career. As such, the
possibility of continuous improvement in the acquisition process because of a long and
stable management is virtually impossible. In the last sixteen years, the executive power
did little to develop the military industrial base. Now, owing to the economic crisis in
Venezuela, and the lower price of oil in the world market, developing this area in the
short run appears impossible. As a result, Venezuela must obtain maintenance, spare
parts, and new weapon systems from its industrialized allies. This will require a more
efficient process to attain the best value.
The absence of one executive agency capable of cost analysis and other
administrative functions, such as contract administration, causes delays in the
procurement process and duplication of functions between agencies. Such is the case of
the contracts, which are revised by as many as three offices during the process. In
addition this absence increases the potential for fraudulent acts by permitting overpricing
and other illegal acts.
In the judicial branch, the main problem is found in the application of sanctions
on the transgressors of the laws affecting contracting. Many public officials and high-
ranking officers were accused of corruption charges but until now only one (President
Carlos Andres Perez in 1993) was sentenced and paid for a corruption charge.
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In addition, in this area, we saw as a positive sign the enactment of the Arbitration
Commercial Law, which represents a huge time reduction and economical approach for
solving disputes in court.
2. Regulatory Framework
The Venezuelan regulations assigned much of the responsibility and oversight of
the procurement process to the military. This situation facilitates in some ways the
possibility for fraudulent acts by the military during the procurement process. My
conclusion is that the absence of regulatory instructions giving oversight power to the
auxiliary office of the Congress in defense procurement is an important factor facilitating
bribery and corruption. In addition, the presence of many corruption cases has increased
regulations to accomplish an acquisition. In which case, many steps have been added and
many revisions are executed with the purpose of enforcing these regulations.
Consequently, the efficiency of the process has been reduced as a direct consequence of
corruption.
Finally, in the revision of the regulatory framework we could not find a directive
statute or other regulatory document that mandates specific timeframes for revision.
Consequently, the time used by each agency in revising contracts or other documents is
subject to agency criteria and generates delays.
3. Organizational framework
The offices involved in the procurement process have undergone transformations
since the enactment of new laws in 1984. However, these transformations are mostly the
results of regulatory ordinances and are not the result of efficiency studies and analysis of
the processes. The incipient use of electronic means and the excessive workload of the
procurement processes make the procurement offices a typical bureaucratic governmental
office where a project can remain for fifteen days waiting for an analyst's
recommendations [Ref.37:p.6/K].
The Direction of Administration of the Ministry of Defense is one of these
overloaded procurement offices, which generates delays in the process. This is because
of continuous revisions of contracts and a limited capacity for analysis. According to the
law, this direction is not a revising office; however the Direction assumes this role trying
to avoid possible mistakes made by the military services during project elaboration. This




In management of the procurement process, we found the following deficiencies:
first, the high levels of rotation among the military personnel working in the procurement
processes is on average 1.5 year and sometimes of less. For example in 1994-1995, the
Director of Acquisition of the Army was rotated four times and, in spite of the
professional capabilities of these military officers, the inefficiency in the acquisition
process was present [Ref.38:p. V-3].
Second, the civilian and military personnel receive more of their training at work
and many times officers involved in negotiation processes learn this difficult task at the
negotiation table. Therefore, this situation creates inefficiencies in the procurement
process and facilitates the possibility for bribery to the officers responsible for the
negotiation by the contractors.
Third, excessive bureaucracies exist in the contract revision process where three
or more agencies perform these revisions before giving final approval and signing a
contract.
Fourth, we found the acquisition process in general and the acquisition phases in
particular highly centralized in Venezuela's Minister of Defense. With the overall
responsibility for the process, the Minister of Defense exerts most of the control of the
procurement and the process is too much in the minister's hands before reaching an
oversight council. This situation facilitates the possibility for the Minister to be corrupted
by the Contractors.
Fifth, in the management of the procurement process, the defense organization is
creating a possible source of corruption from the beginning, when the needs are
established because these requirements are not only operational but also product-oriented.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The major recommendations resulting from this thesis can improve the
procurement, reduce to some extent bribery and corruption, and are based on the
conclusions and findings. These recommendations are
To implement educational courses or seminars for preparing the civilian and
military personnel in the relevant areas of acquisition, such as acquisition
management, contracting, negotiation, electronic resources, and cost analysis.
This educational effort should include professional civilians from the
acquisition workforce in military courses, such as National Defense or
Command and Staff. Also to develop courses in legal matters and application
of the Organic Law of Safeguard and Public Patrimony. In this area also to
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implement at the highest extent possible the use of electronic resources by the
acquisition workforce.
D To reduce to the maximum extent possible the rotation of military personnel
involved in defense procurement. A possible solution is to permit this rotation
only between similar jobs within the acquisition workforce and within a four-
year timeframe. This idea would reduce the learning process and training.
To develop acquisition phases similarly to the U.S. where the mission need
statement must be operationally oriented, and with the General Staff of the
Venezuelan Armed Forces acting as overarching council on each well-defined
milestone. Although this recommendation will not streamline the process, it
can reduce the possibility of fraud.
To limit the contract revision to only one agency, with a regulatory document
that establishes the timeframe to revise the projects by each agency involved
in the procurement process. This will generate a more efficient approach to
contract revision and to accelerate the process.
D To develop a cost analysis agency under the Direction of the Administration
of the Ministry of Defense, which would conduct cost analysis and provide
contracting officials with cost and price information.
To decentralize the procurement process giving the opportunity to each head
of service or department to sign contracts after being approved by the
milestone authority. In this case, we suggest the Joint Chief of Staff as the
milestone authority.
Finally, our last recommendation suggests Congress and the Ministry of Defense
establish a real civilian-military dialogue. This will permit Congress to become familiar
with our Armed Forces through specially oriented courses in national defense and
military doctrine, and will lead to a revision of the important oversight function of
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